Concerning corporate reform, I subscribe to the cynical view that quarterly reporting does nothing to raise the standard of governance.
It would only add to bureaucracy and a surfeit of analysts' recommendations, and allow brokers additional opportunities to 'paint pictures' for their clients in a bid to stimulate transaction churn, thereby increasing short-term speculation and market volatility.
As evidenced recently in the US, some corporate scandals may have been induced by the constant pressure for short-term performance. Has quarterly disclosure in the US proven better at protecting shareholders' interests than London's half-yearly reporting? I think not.
That said, it is probable that both London and Hong Kong will not be able to resist what is becoming the world-wide norm; but let's not kid ourselves that this is actually a governance issue.
Directors of publicly quoted companies cannot sensibly use the invasion-of-privacy defence as a way of avoiding disclosure of their individual pay. The fact that we are concerned with public companies should mean that this is in the public domain.
Perhaps the real reason for wishing to avoid full transparency is that shareholders may then realise that directors' efforts in creating shareholder value are pallid by comparison to their pay.