The provisions did not ban future reforms to the government administration or civil service system, but the underlying objectives were obviously certainty and stability. So it is paradoxical that, of all the initiatives Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa has implemented during his tenure, the accountability system should be the one adopted so successfully, with few hiccups and little public consultation.

Hong Kong's administrative system is characterised by a permanent civil service dominated by generalists, and underpinned by the values of impartiality and political neutrality. This can be traced back to the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms that were introduced gradually in Britain from 1854 to 1920. The system has evolved over time, but a major study initiated by former governor Lord MacLehose largely set the tone of the current structure of government administration in Hong Kong.

A study by McKinsey & Co first undertook a brief examination of the machinery of government in early 1972.

Two other reports in the same and subsequent years went further to identify and recommend ways to improve the machinery of government. The major changes stemming from the reports were the division of the government into branches - to take charge of policy formulation - and departments - to manage implementation. This made way for the introduction of more skilled and specialised staff, to meet the demand for an increasingly sophisticated public administrative system.

The report also made recommendations for improving the government's internal administrative machinery. They included standardising departmental submissions and the establishment and introduction of long-term programme plans. In the longer run, the report recommended hiving off certain functions from the government machinery, such as airport and railway operations.

Over the years, the government has considered various changes to the administrative system. The functions and organisation of policy bureaus and departments have been adjusted to meet the requirements posed by changes in society.

On the specific question of personnel administration, in the early 1980s the Ross Committee - or the Standing Committee on Superscale Salaries - recommended an open directorate system for administrative officers and departmental officers, to increase mobility for generalists and specialists within the government.

At a wider scope, the former finance branch in 1989 published a report on public sector reform, reviewing the division of responsibility between policy branches and their relevant departments. It gave them greater authority to manage their budgets and redeploy savings that had accrued in accounts.

Driven largely by the considerations of managing public finances, the report also examined the setting up of trading funds, contracting out of government services and corporatisation of government departments.

The reform initiatives during the transition period were conducted within the framework of a bureaucracy administered by a permanent civil service, which prided itself on being politically neutral during the colonial era. The administrative system served the former British Hong Kong administration well, since its prevalent task was to administer the colony while political decisions were made in London.

It is not surprising that, when the chief executive came into the system, he found it working at odds with his political role. In the government's own words, 'the original civil service status of principal officials, characterised by a permanent employment status and above all, political neutrality, has increasingly become a mismatch with the demands placed on them in a society which calls for an increasingly responsive and accountable governance'.

Changes were needed, undeniably, either to bring the government administration into line with society's demands or - more essentially - with Hong Kong's new political reality.

But the hasty manner in which changes were introduced flew in the face of the cautious and prudent approaches that have marked previous reforms.

Mr Tung first revealed that he was contemplating changing the system in his policy address in October 2000. Three months after he briefed civil servants in April 2002, the scheme was rolled out in full, on July 1 that year.

Rapidly, and with virtually no public consultation, he managed to bring profound changes to the administrative system of Hong Kong. These included redefining the focus of political power, introducing a tier of ministerial officials with limited tenure and triggering the reshuffling of work between individual policy bureaus - as well as between such bureaus and their respective departments.

Under the accountability system, the 500-strong Administrative Officer Grade, traditionally the ruling elite that takes charge of policy deliberation within the government, will continue to dominate but no longer lead the policy formulation process.

The new tier of principal officials, who are not civil servants but political appointees, is accountable to the chief executive for the success or failure of matters falling within the portfolios assigned to them. Their term of employment does not exceed the term of the chief executive who nominates them for appointment.

The system, in place for two years, has rallied a team of ostensibly like-minded principal officials behind the chief executive to back up his work. It has fared well in this sole objective.

But such solidarity was achieved at the hidden costs of dampened civil service morale and other longer-term concerns.

The disruption and disorientation of ongoing policy priorities caused by changes in principal officials at the termination or completion of their tenure is also bound to affect the work of different policy branches at the time of transition, with a major one promised in 2007.

Unlike many democratic countries, Hong Kong does not have a party system under which the ruling and opposition parties have clear and consistent policy platforms to guide their behaviour. For that matter, it remains in question as to whether principal officials will be committed to goals set by the chief executive, or instead indulge in the pursuit of political demands. At his final question-and-answer session to the last Legislative Council sitting on July 13, Mr Tung admitted that the accountability system still had inadequacies two years after its introduction. One area he identified was how to give principal officials better support. Mr Tung did not make direct reference to the idea of deputy ministers, reportedly being considered by him and his top aides.

Just as he found himself to be a lone fighter his early days in office, Mr Tung can no doubt share the angst of his principal officials in not being able to appoint hand-picked subordinates from outside.

But before bringing in a second or even third tier of accountable officials, Mr Tung and his aides should make a careful assessment of how it would affect the civil service, both as the pillar of Hong Kong's administration and an important workforce.

After all, in reforming a 160,000-strong institution, the strategy may prove too costly a chance to take.