It is very possible that, in just a few years, the financial shape and structure of Asia will evolve in dramatically different ways. If handled properly, the emergence of a more tightly woven region able to work together in the face of currency and economic turbulence should prove a blessing for everyone.
Several factors are working behind the scenes to make this happen. For starters, there is the huge US federal budget deficit and the corresponding weakening of the value of the American currency against many others. Swimming in a sea of denial, the Bush administration portrays the weak dollar as good for US exports (because they become cheap abroad) and explains away the current deficit as a temporary blip that will soon be eviscerated by growth.
Another factor is Asia's less-than-fond memories of America's lassitude during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 that devastated many economies in the region. The Clinton administration is widely remembered as effectively sitting on its hands, rather than extending a helping hand. Worse still, it left the huge mess, which originated with the currency crash in Thailand, in the hands of the unfeeling International Monetary Fund. When it was finished 'solving' the crisis, rather brutally, it left the region in a faint fog of something in the order of mustard gas.
But I may be overstating the residual animosity for the west as a motive for a gradual, large-scale regional economic regrouping. In contrast to me, American political scientist Jennifer Amyx, in the current issue of Asia Pacific Issues noted that: 'Some observers continue to attribute such co-operation to sharpened antagonism between East Asia and the west since the Asian financial crisis. But this view overlooks a key internal driver: China's shift to a more proactive stance towards regional co-operation.'
The economic resurrection of China has led to a huge change in the psychology of the region. When Japan sought to create a sort of Asian IMF - run by Tokyo - during the crisis, the reaction from the region was generally tentative. Having suffered horrifically from Tokyo's wartime campaign, most Asian nations were not quite psychologically ready to accept Japanese leadership on such a bold scale.
But the pan-Asian concept, vague as it was, addressed a deep regional need: the necessity to come together on issues such as currency volatility, a regional bond market and other measures that could give Asia greater financial stability, and to protect against gale-force winds from elsewhere.