Mr Tsang's move reverses efforts by his predecessor, Tung Chee-hwa, to downgrade the role of the chief secretary into something rather fuzzy. Mr Tsang will more 'clearly define' the two top secretaries' portfolios. Most significantly, for day-to-day operations, all ministers will report to the chief secretary and financial secretary, and Mr Tsang said he would work closely with them.

The chief secretary and financial secretary will use the longstanding Policy Committee, comprising the secretary for justice and all ministers, 'as the main platform for policy co-ordination and initial clearance'. This committee, chaired by the chief secretary, fell into disuse during Mr Tung's time, but will again consider all policy proposals before they are submitted to the Executive Council for deliberation.

Mr Tsang wants to expand his own office too. The director of the Chief Executive's Office, a political appointee, will liaise with external bodies including the Legislative Council and the greatly expanded advisory Commission on Strategic Development.

More interestingly, an additional post of permanent secretary will take care of internal management, including co-ordination with Exco and the respective offices of the chief secretary and financial secretary. This civil service position will in many ways be more powerful than that of the director. This may mean the person Mr Tsang wants is a civil servant who does not want to become a political appointee.

Mr Tsang is turning back the clock to a great extent to the colonial 'executive-led' system, although he is polite to say Mr Tung's ministerial system is 'a necessary reform in the path of constitutional development'. He wants us to see the reversal as a step towards 'further consolidation and improvement' of the governing structure when in fact it is being dismantled.

With these moves in place, Mr Tsang believes the 'most pressing need' now is to give the ministers greater support 'to undertake growing political work related to the formulation and implementation of policies, actively reach out to various social sectors and seek wider and more solid public support for the government'.

His idea is to make room for 'a small number of positions dedicated to political affairs' whose main duty will be to support the chief executive and the ministers in their political work. These positions are presumably deputy ministerial posts, which he had suggested once before but the civil service objected. Mr Tsang believes people with political ambition might be willing to become deputies, including civil servants who aspire to become politicians.

How does Exco fit into Mr Tsang's revamp? He will increase the number of unofficial (non-ministerial) members, and the portfolio ministers will be bumped off except for the chief secretary, financial secretary and secretary for justice.

Mr Tsang says this will allow more time and opportunities for the unofficial Exco members 'to express their views and put forward proposals'. He promises the unofficials will 'have more opportunities to participate at an earlier stage of policymaking, and will be able to focus on individual policy areas through division of labour'. He will, however, also require them to 'explain and promote policies' in public.

The success of these latest changes depends on the calibre of Exco members and, more importantly, on an effort by the government to translate political accountability into specific personal responsibilities for Exco to have the legitimacy it needs within a system that cannot have elections to create the government.

The restructured Exco will also likely undermine still further the credibility of the ministers. If they are not full Exco members, how do they differ from the old arrangement under which civil servants were appointed as policy secretaries, performing the duties of ministers without the title?

The ministerial system will forfeit its original justification. It will also become more difficult to cultivate 'political talent' for political roles as these 'outsiders' will in practice be little more than late entrants to the senior ranks of the civil service if deprived of Exco membership. Presumably, political appointments will be based on patronage, like in the old colonial days.

Nevertheless, it will be helpful for the chief executive to pledge to the new Exco that he will ensure members can function better in their constitutional role under the Basic Law.

Article 56 requires the chief executive to consult Exco before making 'important' policy decisions and in introducing legislation. Article 56 also makes it clear that it is a very serious matter for the chief executive to act against 'a majority opinion' of Exco and requires him to put the specific reasons on record.

Yet, no mechanisms are incorporated into the Basic Law by which the chief executive can be compelled to account for his failure to heed the advice of Exco. Furthermore, the chief executive is left to define what is considered 'important policy'.

In the colonial era, there was a similar lack of clarity about what ought to be put to Exco. In the 1990s, senior officials adopted two informal and entirely pragmatic criteria: first, if Exco had been consulted previously on an issue, members would be informed of any significant change in the government's views on the subject; secondly, on new subjects, senior officials would assess whether Exco members themselves would consider that they ought to have been consulted on an issue before the government made its decision.

It can be argued that the whole thrust of Article 56 is to insert into Exco a group of independent 'outsiders' the right to have their views considered seriously before the government undertakes any significant activity. This reading of the Basic Law makes sense if seen within the context that what is needed in our political system is to have some restraining measures within the powerful executive-led structure.

Thus, Exco reform must be judged on whether it will enable the independent 'outsiders' to play that role better. We recommend that Mr Tsang now consider adopting the following measures for that purpose.

Initially, he must fulfil the promise in the policy address that 'a strong government does not work behind closed doors' with a protocol spelling out the circumstances where the administration must take matters to Exco.

This is necessary because the administration has bypassed Exco: the most recent example that made the headlines was the West Kowloon Cultural District project, where the administration had not bothered to report to Exco for an extended period and Exco in fact played a 'limited role' in what is one of Hong Kong's largest development projects.

Mr Tsang must also commit to giving Exco sufficient time and information to consider policy proposals. A constant gripe among councillors is that they are given papers with little time before meetings. In return, the appointees need to be willing to spend considerable time discharging their responsibilities.

The second measure is to be prepared to appoint Exco members in representative capacities. For example, party members are there to represent their parties so that a wider range of views, perspectives and judgments can be brought into Exco's deliberations.

Thirdly, he should consider dropping the rules of collective responsibility and require only limited obligation to confidentiality so that Exco members can play the role as guardian of the public interest and wellbeing by voicing concerns publicly if the executive wants to push ahead with plans that are unready or inappropriate; or refuse to give priority to important matters.

Another measure would be accepting where there are serious disagreements between the administration and a member that the proper action is for the member to resign and for him or her to explain publicly (perhaps in Legco) the reasons why.

Finally, he must accept that the oddities and awkwardness of our political system cannot be cured by making new appointments to Exco alone and that without true representative government, we will still suffer from a democratic deficit, where those in power cannot claim the full political legitimacy to act.

Christine Loh Kung-wai is chief executive of independent think-tank Civic Exchange