The flaws in Beijing's notions of Hong Kong
Lu Ping, one of the mainland's leading players in Hong Kong affairs during the handover, has provided telling insights into Beijing's thinking and inadvertently revealed some of the lack of understanding on which these thoughts were based.
An intriguing person, Mr Lu was often seen by his British counterparts as a 'liberal' force in the Chinese hierarchy during the handover negotiations. However, his alleged liberality was questioned by others who recognised a dyed-in-the-wool Chinese bureaucrat when they saw one.
Yet he is the first mainland official in the handover process to engage in a thoughtful retrospective. Other accounts, notably by former premier Li Peng , scarcely rise above the level of propaganda. But Mr Lu, now retired as director of the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, says he keeps abreast of Hong Kong's affairs on a daily basis.
In a television interview, he conceded that, during the run-up to the handover, Beijing probably paid too much attention to the concerns of tycoons and not enough to other sectors of society.
In some senses this is hardly a revelation, but the self-criticism is new. Yet China's focus on the tycoons was understandable. For the first time in history, a communist state was to assume control over a thriving capitalist enclave that had not collapsed in the way East European capitalist states had after the second world war. Beijing's leaders convinced themselves that, if they could get the tycoons onside, everything else would flow smoothly. And they were perhaps surprised by the alacrity with which the rich people who had fled communist rule were now prepared to switch allegiance overnight on promises of greater wealth.
Mr Lu and his colleagues kept repeating the mantra that Hong Kong was an economic city not a political one and assured themselves that their prime task was to take care of business. What they failed to see, and for supposed Marxists this is quite a failure, is the profound connection between business and politics. They also failed to recognise and continue to deny the way in which Hong Kong society has developed, producing a more assertive civil society despite the worst government efforts to prevent this from happening.
Indeed, it may be argued that the cosy tycoon-government ties have fuelled the growth of civil society groups. In other societies, civic responsibility is seen as a positive, but Beijing's view is different because the leadership rightly appreciates that this strong sense of communal commitment naturally leads to demands for self-government. And, although the tycoons are onside, Mr Lu and his colleagues failed to appreciate their subtle duplicity. The families of practically every tycoon of note, including that of the ultimately chosen Tung Chee-hwa, ensured their sons and daughters held foreign passports. Almost without exception, they shifted the domicile of their firms overseas, so that a majority of Hong Kong public companies are now domiciled abroad. This was a form of political insurance, which was prudent and contradicted the vocal expressions of confidence in the new regime.
Mr Lu appears not to quite understand all this because he made a point of criticising the Jardine group of companies for initiating the so-called 'rat run' for overseas domicile. He compares Jardine unfavourably with the Swire Group, but this conglomerate has always been controlled by a private company in London and has a share structure that makes it immune to hostile takeovers. Jardine was crude and ill advised in the manner of its departure, but has done nothing that has not been copied by the super patriots of the tycoon circle.
The complexities of Hong Kong are too profound to be explained away by the half-baked notion that its people are only concerned with making money. Mr Lu has at least acknowledged that some reassessment of previous beliefs is necessary; a further re-examination would be better.
Stephen Vines is a Hong Kong-based journalist and entrepreneur
