The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty aims to stop the spread of atomic weapons. Yet the organisation set up to police its provisions, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is having an uphill struggle carrying out this task. Syria is proving evasive on inspections of facilities which Israel and the US claim are being used to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has, for the past six years, been similarly obstructive. North Korea pulled out of the NPT in 2002, kicking out IAEA inspectors so that it could go ahead with making bombs. Iraq misled the organisation in 1991 and was unco-operative with investigative teams. India, Israel and Pakistan are the only nations not to sign the accord, allowing them to develop nuclear weapons and, in the case of the latter, proliferate.
To suggest that the NPT is stopping the spread of nuclear arms or even making an atomic war less likely is, in such circumstances, laughable. A way has to be found to strengthen its provisions so that the risk of terrorists making dirty bombs, or weapons being developed to threaten rivals, can be prevented.
The basis for a solution already exists. A deal formulated by US President George W. Bush's administration with India last August to transfer nuclear technology in exchange for contracts and safeguards is, in principle, the way forward. Where the as-yet unapproved agreement falters is in some of the details and the fact that the US is not an honest broker.
IAEA director Mohamed ElBaradei has endorsed the deal; he has called it a pragmatic way to bring India into the non-proliferation community. Under it, US companies would be able to build nuclear power plants in India and provide fuel for the country's civilian energy programme. India would agree to inspections of reactors of its choosing, continue a moratorium on atomic weapons testing, strengthen the security of its arms arsenals and support international non-proliferation efforts.
India needs the accord so that nuclear reactors can be built more quickly, to meet burgeoning electricity demands. But approval is being held up by political parties opposed to the US. They have good reason to object: a stronger partnership with America will increase friction with China, furthering regional instability.
Critics like Charles Ferguson, a nuclear physicist and fellow for science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations think-tank in Washington, point out that China's rise worries the US and a pact with India would be a counterbalance. That aside, the deal has insufficient safeguards to prevent India producing more weapons.