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How I Caused the Credit Crunch

David Wilson

How I Caused the Credit Crunch

by Tetsuya Ishikawa

Icon, HK$117

On the strength of the title alone the author will doubtless shift many copies of this book. Whether Tetsuya Ishikawa, an Oxford University graduate, needs the money is doubtful. Highly reminiscent of Andrew Dover, the English sharp operator at the heart of his story, Ishikawa was a trader who spent seven years at the cutting edge of credit markets.

Fresh out of Oxford University, Ishikawa's alter ego is given the job of managing stacks of other people's money. New to the complexity of hedge funds, sub-prime mortgages and the like, Dover still gladly dives into the lustful world of banking.

After landing an enormous bonus, Dover blossoms into an international playboy who orchestrates deals worth billions in the swish bars, brothels, poker clubs and stock markets of London, New York, Frankfurt and Tokyo.

A la Brett Easton Ellis, the author conveys with aplomb the cashed-up yuppie trashiness of the world Dover inhabits. Witness the episode in which Dover takes a fellow banker to a branch of the hip French lounge chain Buddha Bar. 'A trendy and fashionable bar for 363 days of the year,' Ishikawa writes, 'it was spoilt for the other two days by the presence of hundreds of pasty credit bankers ordering an excessive number of margaritas and driving away what would otherwise have been a young, cool, sexy and tanned Spanish crowd. There was even a queue outside, all of whom seemed to know Howard, such that by the time we had gone to the end of it, Howard's palms were moist from all the sweaty bankers' hands he had shaken.'

So realistic that you smell the sweat, the book reflects the author's background. Since the late 1990s he has worked at seven global investment banks and now regularly contributes to The Guardian newspaper and defends bankers on TV. Apparently the suits are not to blame for the current meltdown: 'Scapegoating bankers and CEOs was all too easy because it's so much more gratifying to hit a person than an object, or even an idea.'

The correct target and root cause, it seems, is the system. Bankers only did what any rational humans would have in the same situation (grab as much cash as possible).

The truth, he argues, is that during the boom, economic and social progress unfolded, making home ownership more than a dream: a right that many will continue to enjoy through the credit crunch and beyond.

He may have a point. Still, his fictionalised account of real experience packs far less of a punch than it might. Much of the financial analysis makes turgid reading. Try deciphering this: 'At a time when 8 per cent was the equivalent of LIBOR +2.5 per cent, and every other AAA investment was returning no more than LIBOR +0.5 per cent, this was a massive 'pick-up' of 2 per cent in return and much more like a traditional A-rated or BBB-rated investment.'

Bamboozled? Despite flashes of brilliance and compelling relevance, Ishikawa's snappily titled, swaggering debut does not deliver.

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