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Have the confidence to embrace ethnic diversity

The central government has responded swiftly to the first direct threat against China by al-Qaeda, warning Chinese citizens overseas to tighten security and pledging to do all it can to ensure their safety. In the longer term, however, the circumstances raise questions about Beijing's policies towards its ethnic and Muslim minorities which must be tackled.

Beijing's reaction marks a loss of innocence. The vast Chinese diaspora is no stranger to the vicissitudes of ethnic minorities. But it has escaped indiscriminate targeting by terrorism. The deadly clashes between Muslim Uygurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang have apparently changed that. According to a private intelligence briefing first reported by this newspaper, an Algerian-based branch of the al-Qaeda terror network has called on its followers to avenge Muslim deaths. The central government has rightly taken it very seriously, issuing a specific warning to Chinese people and organisations in Algeria. It has also appealed for understanding from the Muslim world of its actions and policies towards the Uygurs.

Beijing has invested hugely in its relations with Muslim nations, offering an alternative source of aid, trade deals and investment in return for access to natural resources. Externally, its policies can be counted a diplomatic, economic and political success. Internally, however, its management of religious and ethnic relations cannot. Economic largesse distributed by the central government has not secured social harmony; ethnic minorities claim economic and cultural discrimination in favour of Han migrants. With the al-Qaeda threat, the failure of Beijing's policies has opened up another dimension of the problem and highlighted China's growing vulnerability as a world power with global interests. The reaction of most Islamic countries to the Xinjiang riots has been muted, partly because of a desire to keep on good terms with Beijing, but the threat suggests al-Qaeda feels no such constraint.

Muslims account for a small proportion of China's huge population but more than half the 20 million people in Xinjiang, a vast swathe of territory bordering Central Asia which accounts for a large proportion of the nation's scarce oil and gas reserves. Given the historical consequences of disunity to China, it is not surprising that officials equate ethnic nationalism with the spectre of separatism. This is why there is a policy of encouraging Han migration, and a linking of the unrest with 'separatists, extremists and terrorists'. Beijing has been affronted by seeming ingratitude for generous development policies that have brought economic benefits to one of the nation's poorest regions. Many Chinese sympathise with that feeling. However, Uygurs say the benefits are not being shared fairly and do nothing to meet their cultural and religious needs.

Beijing is right to react to the al-Qaeda threat by focusing on the safety of Chinese citizens and increased co-operation with other countries to fight terrorism. But it should not ignore the warning signal that its management of Muslim minorities is also an issue. Uygur claims of economic inequality and social injustice resonate with the widening income gaps and official corruption blamed for social unrest nationwide. Such underlying causes should not be allowed to become obscured by racial overtones, ethnic stereotyping and nationalism. China is now a world power in its own right. For the sake of the oft-quoted goal of social harmony and its relations with the Muslim world, it should be confident enough to rethink its approach, and reconcile its historical fear of disunity with the strengths to be found in cultural diversity.

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