In the wake of the Asian markets crash of the late 1990s, it became no longer fashionable to talk about the Asian Tigers and their wondrous performance. But memories are short and it didn't take long for this kind of talk to be replaced by admiring references to the Celtic Tiger in Ireland and the remarkable resurgence of the previously sleepy Greek economy - not forgetting the miracle in the Iberian Peninsula, where Spain and, to a lesser extent Portugal, were showing the rest of Europe how economic growth really worked.
Until, as in Asia, the party came to an abrupt halt.
As Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, an executive board member of the European Central Bank, told an audience in Hong Kong in February, what followed 'might give those of you living in emerging economies a sense of deja vu'.
He noted how the so-called Asian Tigers were lauded for their impressive economic growth rates, how their governments were complimented for relaxing controls so that financial markets could flourish, and how, as money poured into these economies, real borrowing rates fell and some sectors registered truly impressive gains, especially the property market.
That was all to the good. But as Smaghi also reminded his audience, what followed also had a familiar ring. No one liked to question whether these massive capital inflows were necessarily beneficial, especially when it became apparent that the money that flowed in so easily could, just as abruptly, flow out.
Moreover, these inflows carried inflationary risks. As the economies flourished, it became easier for governments to turn a blind eye to the weak state of public finances and to shuffle many government liabilities off the balance sheet.