The current round of revision to the CPL - passed in 1979 and last revised in 1996 - actually began in 2003, law professors consulted on the draft amendments said, but a huge gulf in understanding between the legal community and law enforcement departments on the role of the country's criminal legal system delayed the first draft until last week.

While persuading law enforcement agencies to give up their powers is naturally hard, the mainland has reached a stage of social development where it must do something more drastic to boost people's confidence in the state and especially the criminal justice system, which is critical to maintaining social stability.

First of all, many improvements in the CPL could have gone further. For example, the revised law is just bringing the rights of lawyers in line with the 2007 Lawyers' Law, but adding little. How about introducing steps towards having lawyers present at interrogations? Or removing the specific mention of 'lawyers' in a clause which should apply to everyone who destroys or fabricates evidence?

Another result of heavy compromises in drafting the amendments is that well-intentioned clauses are now laden with exceptions, creating dangerous loopholes that could defeat their original intent.

In particular, human rights activists are worried about changes to the 'residential surveillance' measure, which will make it legal for dissidents to be detained in a secret location for up to six months without their family being informed of what happened to them.

Mainland law professors said amendments to residential surveillance provisions were meant to add details to the measure so it could be used to replace detention after arrest, which should be a good thing. However, human rights activists worry that singling out cases of state security, terrorism and major corruption as exceptions will create room for abuse, especially with 'state security' - a charge frequently used to prosecute outspoken dissidents, such as Liu Xiaobo and Hu Jia .

Mainland authorities need to ask themselves why must these exceptions be included in the general criminal code, and what message it sends out. Some critics say they can see Beijing's efforts to build the rule of law, but inconsistencies like these broad exceptions are making them question whether the government is merely appearing to act in line with human rights norms, but has no real intention to enforce them.

Even if authorities do find it necessary to keep the exceptions, they must add procedural safety valves. Right now the only restraint is that surveillance outside a suspect's usual residence (i.e. at an ill-defined 'specified residence') must be approved by prosecutors or police one level higher than those investigating the case.

Could the law be amended so that such a decision must be approved by a court? If not, approved by the Ministry of Public Security or Supreme People's Procuratorate? What about a detailed redress procedure for suspects wrongfully held at a specified residence?

And lastly, the rationale behind the ban on informing family members if a person suspected of endangering state security or terrorism is placed under residential surveillance at a 'specified residence' is perplexing. If the purpose of such secrecy is indeed to promote investigation, making an important suspect 'disappear' then having family members asking around about them will only draw more attention.

This ban also makes access to lawyer advice in such situations, allowed under the amendments, meaningless since the suspect could only hire a lawyer through the investigators.

Fortunately, this is only the first draft, and mainland experts expect the amendments to go through a few more readings.

As the authorities promulgate their visions of 'people first' and 'social harmony', they should use this opportunity to make some concrete changes and show their commitment to the protection of human rights.