China's slow but sure democratisation

Since Xi Jinping was anointed as China's new leader, reports of official repression of dissent have hardly abated. But, while criticism of China's human rights record clearly has merit, it is important not to lose sight of the extent of genuine political change.

Since 1978, China's political system has overseen the transfer of a wide swathe of economic power from the state to its people. As a result, Chinese may operate family farms, own homes and businesses, control their educational choices, patent inventions and amass fortunes. It is precisely the exercise of these individual rights that has created the foundation for China's ongoing economic transformation.

By creating the diverse and conflicting private economic interests that are typical of a capitalist society, China has had to create a set of institutions to clarify and mediate the exercise of these rights. These emerging institutional arrangements include contracts and commercial law, bankruptcy and labour codes, and courts to oversee their enforcement. More recently, local commissions, non-governmental organisations, an increasingly assertive media and sanctioned public demonstrations have become established channels for mediating social conflict.

But the transfer of rights has often been ambiguous, and is all too frequently vulnerable to official corruption. As a result, the Communist Party is facing growing demands from the country's well-educated and affluent middle class for greater transparency and accountability in the institutions on which their careers and livelihoods depend.

The enactment of the Administrative Procedure Law in 1990 enabled Chinese citizens to file lawsuits against local governments and public agencies. In recent years, hundreds of thousands of NGOs, often with official approval, have represented individuals on bread-and-butter issues, including land seizures, housing demolitions, environmental abuses, labour rights and health care. The number of lawsuits against the government has ballooned to more than 100,000 per year, with plaintiffs winning more than one-third of the cases.

Another avenue through which Chinese residents advance their interests is public protest. Across the country, residents often protest against wrongful eviction from their homes, frequently at the hands of corrupt local officials. One of us recently observed a street protest in Wuhan . Armed with banners and placards and a permit to demonstrate, street protesters, having learned that their homes were to be razed for redevelopment, agitated for and eventually secured substantially more compensation than the local government initially offered.

Such protests against public agencies, employers and developers are now commonplace (though not always authorised). Indeed, China's leaders recognise that if these channels for public expression of grievances were not available, the potential for civil and political unrest would be far greater than it already is. Generally, provided that protesters seek mediation and redress for their economic rights and do not attempt to encroach on the party's authority, residents can advocate for their interests.