How can we characterise Latin America’s foreign policy towards the People’s Republic of China?
My struggle to answer this question, in writing an academic article, made me realise that the new economy of the Pacific forces us to re-evaluate how we understand Latin America and what we mean by foreign policy.
The most important differences among the states of Latin America and the Caribbean today with regard to China are about economics, not politics. We can distinguish the political orientation implicit in former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez’s attempt to enlist China in an anti-imperialist alliance from that implied by Mexico’s receipt of the Dalai Lama under the government of Felipe Calderon. Similarly, we can contrast Bolivian President Evo Morales’ declared admiration for Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Zedong with Brazil’s frustration that China did not support its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Latin American scholars and political leaders rightly observe that the region has no coherent policy on how to engage China
During the dramatic expansion of China’s engagement with Latin America in the past decade, however, it is difficult to identify more than a handful of non-economic issues that have substantially shaped the agenda.
Latin American scholars and political leaders rightly observe that the region has no coherent policy on how to engage China. Nonetheless, in my new study, I argue that its diversity of responses can be understood through four overlapping divisions: (1) north versus south, (2) populist socialist regimes versus market economies, (3) differences in economic structure and (4) Pacific versus Atlantic.
The north-versus-south divide in the region reflects the integration of the economies of Mexico and Central America with the United States and Canada as a product of geographical proximity, trade accords such as Nafta and Cafta-DR, and human ties, with many immigrants from these countries working in the United States and sending remittances to family at home.
