Tibet's long road to peace with China has an end if suspicions are put aside
Tenzin Norgay says by doing so, a reconciliation process started 100 year ago could be completed
Modern China has a wide range of problems. Hardly anyone doubts that Tibet is a historical and political problem for China. In the passionate debate about the status of Tibet, few realise that Tibet's modern peacemaking project with China began a century ago: the Dalai Lama's "middle way" policy has its genesis in an obscure conference 100 years ago yesterday.
On April 27, 1914, British India, China and Tibet signed a tripartite accord at Simla. And thus was born the concept of inner and outer Tibet and the infamous McMahon line that divides India and China. Today, India, China and the Tibetans live in the peculiar legacy of that failed secret conference - a byproduct of the Great Game. The fact is that the origin for Tibet's division in the Tibet autonomous region and four neighbouring Chinese provinces, and the 90,000 square kilometres eastern-sector territorial dispute between India and China can be traced to this convention.
All the 1914 stakeholders later adapted that conference according to nationalist narratives; Tibetans claim it as a proof of independence, China considers it one of the unequal treaties forced upon it during the "century of humiliation", and India argues legalistically that Arunachal Pradesh is its territory as the successor state of British India.
But all parties have failed to see what it was all about to begin with. It was simply a peacemaking deal to keep armed hostilities in abeyance during the political flux of early 20th century.
Before imperial Britain arrived on the Asian scene, Tibet and China coexisted geographically and have developed a complex relationship over the centuries. Unable to fully grasp the peculiarities of this relation, Britain conveniently termed it suzerainty.
Sovereignty is a fluid concept that is best understood today in terms of territoriality. Despite all its failings, the Westphalian nation-state system is here to stay. There are no alternatives, and it has been relatively successful in maintaining international peace and prosperity, including China's own rise.
In these early decades of the 21st century, nobody doubts the sovereignty of China over Tibet. China has risen. But its Leviathan-like domestic governance has created major grievances among its minorities. Ironically, China acts like an insecure power despite all the muscles in its power metrics. It is about time China takes more global responsibility to further prosper the Westphalian system and stop acting like an insecure Leviathan.