Beijing's fear of separatism looms large in Hong Kong's political reform
Andrew Leung says though limits on 2017 election are here to stay, improvements can still be made
At this make-or-break moment in our political history, it is time for both sides to calm down a little. The Scottish referendum, while different from our situation, may offer some useful perspectives.
Like in Hong Kong, the political rift in the United Kingdom has been exposed. While 55 per cent of Scots voted to keep the union, some 1.6 million of them voted for independence. Disappointed Scottish nationalists are pressing for maximum devolution while Westminster hints at barring Scottish politicians from voting on English laws. Indeed, ripples of separatism and self-rule are spreading far and wide.
These repercussions must be anathema to Beijing. National sovereignty and territorial integrity are at the very top of China's "core interests".
How China's sovereign powers and Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy can work together is spelt out in the Basic Law. Against perceived contrary views, the State Council has seen fit to elucidate these powers in a white paper.
The Scottish referendum shows how precious the union is to Britain. In a similar way, while Beijing remains eager to see "one country, two systems" succeed, it abhors the risk of a chief executive being elected who may lead Hong Kong towards separatism. That's why Beijing would never give up the safeguards of a nominating committee in Article 45 of the Basic Law.
Activists question the legitimacy of the "universal suffrage" offered by Beijing. This questioning, however justified, ignores certain important considerations.
First, the nominating committee is designed to represent broadly the four constituent sectors that underpin Hong Kong's social and economic fabric - entrepreneurs, professionals, the grass roots, and politicians. As such, it cannot be dismissed as entirely unrepresentative.
Second, though Beijing has pronounced on the size of the nominating committee (1,200 members), it is open to consultation how membership of the sectors could be made more broadly representative.
Third, mechanisms can be put in place to ensure the nominating process is as open and competitive as possible.
Fourth, the winning vote margin for the election is open to consultation. We could require, say, support of at least 50 per cent of the voting public.
Provided these issues are adequately addressed, it is hard to see why election of the chief executive in compliance with Article 45 should be dismissed out of hand.
Last but not least, it must be remembered that Hong Kong is not an independent nation. The chief executive must be appointed by, answerable to, and able to work with Beijing.
Nevertheless, when all is said and done, what counts is the actual governing power. The Hong Kong government has always been executive-led and remains so under the Basic Law. This mode of governance worked in the colonial days when all legislators were appointed. Now, all legislators are elected, but they don't form the government. It consists of ministers appointed by the chief executive, who does not represent any political party. Unable to share the power and responsibility of governing, parties are prone to put their own political capital ahead of anything else.
In future, a chief executive elected by universal suffrage will need to sustain public support and ensure policies have a clearer passage through the legislature. There is no better way to do this than by sharing governing power with political parties. This can be achieved by appointing suitable ministers with strong but informal party affiliations.
Any concerns about a party's political stance need not be insurmountable, provided that these ministers are appointed as individuals, not as party representatives.
The availability of sufficient candidates of acceptable calibre whom Beijing can trust may be a problem. However, given thought and nurturing, this possibility cannot be ruled out.
If this method could work, it would provide a powerful incentive for legislators to be more supportive of the administration, making Hong Kong's politics less fractious and governance more sustainable.
It would also be conducive to building trust between Beijing and certain legislators, possibly auguring well for their future acceptability as potential candidates for chief executive.
The historic opportunity in 2017 for the chief executive to be elected by "one man, one vote" is a giant but first step in Hong Kong's quest for democracy. However, compliance with the Basic Law, while making the method of universal suffrage less ideal, is an inviolable imperative binding the marriage of "one country" with the "two systems".
With experience and more trust-building, it is possible that the scheme could become much less restrictive over time. If, for want of imagination, the baby is immediately thrown out with the bathwater, all the subsequent wailing and gnashing of teeth is unlikely to guarantee a quantum leap in democracy any time thereafter.
