The good, bad and downright ugly aspects of US naval operations in the South China Sea

The US has undertaken two recent “freedom of navigation” operations using formidable Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers to challenge what it considers illegal claims in the South China Sea. One was by the USS Lassen last October 27, which sailed within 12 nautical miles of the formerly submerged Subi Reef in the Spratlys. The most recent was on January 30 by the USS Curtis Wilbur, which sailed within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island in the Paracels.

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According to the US Department of Defence this operation “challenged attempts by the three claimants, China, Taiwan and Vietnam, to restrict navigation rights and freedoms around the features ... The excessive claims regarding Triton Island are inconsistent with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention ... No claimants were notified prior to the transit which is consistent with our normal process and international law.”

There will be more operations – indeed they may become a regular feature of the US naval presence in the region. But they are controversial. These two were verbally supported by US friends and allies – and ardently opposed by China, which claims and occupies these features. Indeed, these operations have good, bad and downright ugly aspects and implications.

The good: The US argues that it is defending a universally accepted principle that is critical to trade. It says it is providing a “free good” in protecting freedom of navigation for all. Behind its lofty rhetoric, the US is clearly challenging attempts by China and others to unilaterally interpret or change international law to their benefit. These operations were supported by its allies – the Philippines, Japan, South Korea and Australia – and by Vietnam – all of which have their own maritime concerns with a militarily burgeoning China. Both operations challenged not just China’s requirement of prior permission for warships to enter its territorial sea but also the prior notification requirements of Vietnam and Taiwan, which also claim these features. The Curtis Wilbur operation also challenged China’s baselines drawn around the Paracels – a claim that has no basis in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos).

These operations demonstrated that the US is truly trying to uphold international law, or its interpretation thereof, rather than single out and provoke China. In one interpretation of “good”, the US is trying to dissuade China from deploying advanced weapons to the features it controls. The Curtis Wilbur operation was relatively “soft” compared to that of the USS Lassen, which may account for China’s subdued response. It is even possible that a conflict-avoidance regime is forming between the two rivals regarding these operations.

The bad: The US is really primarily concerned with freedom of navigation for its warships and planes engaged in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance off China’s coast. But it is conflating this concern with freedom of commercial navigation to garner support for its position and opposition to China’s attempts to constrain these probes.

But the Lassen freedom of navigation operation was confused and confusing. Moreover, its message was muddled. It was unclear which excessive claim by whom was being challenged. The Curtis Wilbur operation was much clearer and less provocative in that the vessel followed a major shipping route rather than going out of its way to make its point like the Lassen.