Why it’s in Beijing’s best interests to keep cross-strait relations on an even keel
Michal Thim says China may not like the ambiguous wording in Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration speech, but it will find enough there to support peaceful co-existence, based on a mutual tolerance of differences
Beijing expresses dissatisfaction after Tsai Ing-wen swaps ‘consensus’ for ‘historic fact’
Instead, she referred to cross-strait arrangements using ambiguous wording. Primarily, she noted that in 1992, “the two institutions representing each side across the strait ... arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings”. “Since 1992, over 20 years of interactions and negotiations across the strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-strait relationship must be continuously promoted,” she said.
This may not be exactly what Beijing wants to hear but ambiguity in diplomatic speech is often of greater value than clarity. Tsai did not refer to “one China”, yet she also did not explicitly declare that cross-strait ties are relations between two sovereign states.
In light of today’s political realities, Beijing needs to rethink what ‘one China’ really means
There is considerable room to keep relations free of major tensions if Beijing truly wishes. But the main reason why Beijing should focus on the positive aspects of Tsai’s inauguration speech is that it does not have a better option.
Threatening Tsai with suspension of talks until she says a few magic words just makes Beijing look like a bully
China’s Taiwan policy is in need of a major overhaul and Beijing only has itself to blame. Its view of cross-strait relations became too contingent on the Kuomintang staying in power. But Taiwanese voters won’t accept de facto single-party rule. Taiwan’s democracy is a great source of pride for Taiwanese across all political divisions and voters will insist they have the main say in selecting a government that represents them. If Beijing’s only reaction is to double down on insistence over the “1992 consensus”, then it can hardly be surprised if it receives a lukewarm response.
Moreover, networks cultivated by Beijing in Taiwan are mostly KMT-linked interests. That was the easy path to follow. After the KMT was defeated in the 2004 elections, it was a bit too eager to reach out to its erstwhile rival, the Chinese Communist Party, which reciprocated in kind.
After all, both parties shared a common interest: to ensure the Democratic Progressive Party administration failed, which would in turn ensure the KMT returned to power. However, eight years after the KMT retook the helm, not only has this approach failed to win over hearts and minds, it also limits Beijing’s ability to employ punitive measures.
Whatever punishment Beijing may come up with to express its displeasure with the new administration, the first to suffer will be the KMT-linked local power holders and businesses.