The chief executive election Hong Kong could have had
David Zweig considers what might have been under a rejected electoral reform plan, on the eve of the vote for Hong Kong’s next leader
Beijing did not offer us true democracy, as a nomination committee with a 50 per cent threshold would have prevented any pan-democrat from joining the territory-wide chief executive election. Under what at best could be called “Iranian-style democracy”, a coterie of appointed “mullahs” would have determined the candidates before allowing all the people to vote. But in Iran, the people have elected moderate clerics, greatly influencing Iran’s politics.
To envision what Sunday’s election could have looked like, imagine two tents. One tent holds Hongkongers who favour greater democracy. They comprise 60 per cent of Hong Kong people who have consistently voted for pan-democratic candidates in the geographical constituencies. A smaller tent holds 30 per cent of the population who regularly back pro-government and pro-Beijing candidates. Another 10 per cent remain undecided which tent they prefer. Interestingly, mainland observers of Hong Kong society with whom I have talked recognise this 60-40 split within the Hong Kong electorate.
What pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong opposed is that under the August 31 mechanism, the two or three candidates running for chief executive on Sunday would have been drawn only from among politicians within the smaller, pro-government, pro-Beijing tent, while the 60 per cent of the citizenry within the democratic tent would have had no one representing their interests in the race.
Under the August 31 scenario, candidates would have to play to two constituencies: the 30 per cent who favour the government and Beijing, and the 60 per cent who favour further democratisation. Candidates would have to be careful to maintain support from people in the pro-government, pro-Beijing tent, as no one would want to surrender 30 per cent of the vote to their opponent.
Then the winning strategy would have been to take a more moderate political position and propose policies attractive to members in the pro-democracy tent, for whoever got the majority in that tent would be the next leader. The run-up to the election would have been exciting, unpredictable and, as with any democratic vote, candidates would present competing views on policies. In Hong Kong, those would include policies on housing, pensions, education, and innovative ways to spend an excessive government surplus. Even political reform might have made it onto the agenda, something Lam under the current electoral format need not discuss.
Has Beijing changed its mind about giving Hong Kong people the vote?
Beijing sees democratisation as dangerous and potentially destabilising; they look at the Arab spring, the civil war in Syria and Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost, or political opening. In their eyes, an unstable democratic transition could undermine 40 years of economic growth and end China’s aspiration (Xi’s “China Dream”) of re-emerging as a great power. They prefer to move cautiously. Reforms in China have always been tested through local experiments – think of the special economic zones – so if they fail, damage to stability is manageable.
What better way, then, to experiment with democracy than to test it in Hong Kong under controlled conditions? Perhaps a successful election on Sunday, in line with the August 31 proposal, might have encouraged democratic experiments on the mainland. Then again, maybe not. But imagine if in every city in China, two local Communist Party leaders competed for the mayoralty and all citizens in the city were allowed to vote. That would be progress.
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Still, had they accepted the deal, Sunday’s election would look very different, both in its influence on government policy in Hong Kong over the next five years and in its potential impact on the future of democratisation in China.
David Zweig is chair professor in the Division of Social Sciences and director of the Centre on China’s Transnational Relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology