How North Korea’s nuclear weapons are testing Seoul’s special ties with the US

Gary Samore, of the Belfer Centre at Harvard and formerly with the Obama administration, suggested in a wide-ranging debate on “the future of geopolitics in East Asia” that the problem may be insoluble. That sense weighs heavily on policymakers in Seoul as well as Washington. How can the two agree on a common approach, and where is South Korea going in its alliance with the US?

Chinese participants seemed far more concerned about the US countermissile battery known as THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence), set up some 200km south of Seoul, than about North Korean missile tests. Asked whether the “US pivot” to Asia would continue under the Trump administration, Wang Dong of Peking University railed against the dangers of THAAD’s radar spying on Chinese forces. Japanese military power was also on expert minds. Alexis Dudden, from the University of Connecticut, saw Prime Minister Shinzo Abe longing “to break Japan free” of Article 9 of its pacifist post-war constitution, a warning of the renaissance of Japanese militarism. But she was hopeful about new South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s potential to de-weaponise “the region’s so-called history wars”.

Moon is open to dialogue with North Korea. US President Donald Trump, by contrast, seems unable to decide what he would prefer – sitting down with Kim Jong-un for a burger or ordering a “pre-emptive strike” against the North’s nuclear and missile facilities. Moon would doubtless like to persuade Kim to stop test-firing missiles long enough to be able to follow through on gestures towards reconciliation. Trump, meanwhile, is waiting to see if President Xi Jinping ( 習近平 ) can restrain North Korea.