What next for US and South Korea, as China stands by nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un?
Shim Jae Hoon says with Beijing, and even Moscow, siding with Pyongyang, and with economic sanctions unlikely to dampen Kim’s nuclear ambitions, the US and Seoul will have to reassess their strategy in the peninsula
North Korea’s midnight test-launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile that could potentially reach California and beyond places Washington under threat. The test provoked US President Donald Trump to castigate China and pushed South Korea into a tighter embrace with the United States.
South Korea under new President Moon Jae-in had been holding back on deployment of the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) anti-missile system and calling for talks with Pyongyang, but changed its stance within hours of the latest test, urging US help to strengthen its own missile capability. Such measures may be emotionally satisfying, but are no match for the North Korean challenge.
The missile launched on July 28, in engine power and precision navigational system, represents a dramatic improvement over the first ICBM tested more than three weeks earlier. South Korean analysts warn that the North will soon produce an improved model capable of hitting all parts of the US.
Kim Jong-un is confident of already achieving that goal. “Our missiles can now hit anywhere in the US and at any time,” he boasted shortly after the launch. North Korean television clips showed him tensely watching the launch pad from an underground bunker, then bursting into delight once it had soared.
The launch was timed so that news would reach Washington in daylight hours. Even the launch site was chosen for maximum geopolitical impact, with the missile fired from a site in the Mupyongni munitions area near China. The implication: the US would risk hitting Chinese territory in the event it decides to attack the site.
The possibility of war appeared to bother neither China nor Russia, two close neighbours that have recently expanded political and economic connections with the Pyongyang regime. The close ties are as much a reflection of deteriorating relations with Washington as their own geopolitical calculation.
Both China and Russia have refused to cooperate at the UN Security Council in recent months to condemn North Korean actions. According to reports from South Korea, Russia has emerged as a new source of oil for Pyongyang, in addition to China’s supplies; its exports of fuel in the first five months of this year were double the amount from last year.
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North Korea’s latest launch poses an acute dilemma for the South and the US, which must re-evaluate past policies of relying on China to help restrain Pyongyang. Trump must find new ways to deal with the North. While any military response would have catastrophic consequences for the peninsula, talking with North Korea and accepting it as a nuclear-weapon state are unthinkable for Trump who opposed similar status for Iran.
I am very disappointed in China. Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade, yet...
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) July 29, 2017
...they do NOTHING for us with North Korea, just talk. We will no longer allow this to continue. China could easily solve this problem!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) July 29, 2017
The North Korean challenge presents a quandary for the South’s new centre-left president as well. Moon took office in May, vowing to seek dialogue and peaceful exchanges, more or less a resumption of the old “Sunshine Policy” tried unsuccessfully by his predecessors.
Visiting Washington in June to meet Trump, Moon proposed retaking the driver’s seat on the North Korean issue, saying he would explore the possibility of reopening talks with Kim. That initiative now lies in tatters before even starting.
Moon has been forced to change course; not only does he propose stand-alone sanctions on Pyongyang, he is asking Washington to modify current bilateral guidelines on South Korea’s missile technology, so that he can increase the missile payload from 500 kg to a one-tonne level. Defence experts suggest this would improve the chances of South Korean missiles penetrating underground military facilities in the North concealing missiles and aircraft. Moon is also asking the US to provide missiles that can destroy some of 7,000 underground bunkers scattered across North Korea.
While all this will strengthen Seoul’s deterrence capability, Kim is unlikely to slow the pace of his missile-assisted propaganda efforts calling for the opening of “peace talks” with the US. His campaign to replace the current armistice agreement with a permanent “peace treaty” has won support from Beijing and Moscow.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) in March officially endorsed what he described as a “double freeze” proposal, under which Pyongyang would “freeze” its nuclear programme in exchange for Seoul and Washington stopping annual military exercises “in and around the Korean peninsula”. Neither Seoul nor Washington is keen to take up this proposal for the obvious reason that it does not offer “denuclearisation” or a “missile moratorium.” North Korean state media make it clear that under no circumstances would the nation give up its nuclear weapons, citing the fate of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, who “could not avoid facing doom” after giving up their nuclear weapons.
Besides, Wang’s proposal calling for ending “military exercises in and around the Korean peninsula” would imply limiting exercises by US allies in the region, including Japan. That would ultimately benefit Beijing and Pyongyang at the risk of restricting US military alliances with Tokyo and Seoul.
For that matter, Seoul and Washington are not interested in a proposal for replacing the current armistice with a permanent peace treaty under terms set by the North. This would exclude South Korea’s participation on the grounds that Seoul was not a signatory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
For his part, Kim is unlikely to give up calling for a peace conference. For him, withdrawal of US troops is an unwavering commitment on which the regime bases the reason of its existence. Moreover, the North Korean leadership has never quite abandoned the cardinal aim of reunification under Pyongyang’s terms. Indeed, given the total dedication of economic resources to nuclear arms and missiles, while starving millions of its populace, the regime hasn’t essentially changed its course of achieving reunification along the South Vietnamese model of swift conquest in the absence of US forces.
With the option of meaningful negotiations practically closed for the time being, US and South Korean policymakers focus on maintaining the strategy of keeping Pyongyang isolated and tightly sanctioned. The Trump administration is mulling over declaring a red line beyond which the North’s provocation would not be tolerated. Abandoning its dovish stance, the South Korean government welcomes newly passed legislation applying punitive sanctions and “secondary boycotts” on all countries, officials, banks and businesses that do deals with North Korea.
With the economic screws expected to tighten, US and South Korean forces on the ground are strengthening their preparedness, unveiling a new strategy of responding to every new missile launch from the North with a tactical missile counter-launch. However, Pyongyang has lived dangerously for too long to be deterred by such threats, especially as China, worried about a North Korean collapse and a US-backed Korean regime on its border, sticks by it.
Any optimism expressed by the US and South Korean presidents on dealing with Beijing and Pyongyang is unfounded, and the moment of truth is approaching fast.
Shim Jae Hoon is a journalist based in Seoul. Reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu