For all its power, China can’t sever Taiwan’s links to the rest of the world
Michal Thim says the poaching of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic allies may seem a symbolic victory for Beijing, but it will do little to dent the island’s relationships with its unofficial allies
But calling countries that recognise Taiwan “allies” doesn’t really reflect the true meaning of the term, considering that some have been quite eager to initiate the change. The Dominican Republic mulled such a move as early as 2013, for example.
Though “diplomatic ally” is a misnomer, it is a term rooted in the struggle between Beijing and Taipei.
Since Taiwan’s democratisation in the 1990s and China’s rise to the status of global power, the old dispute over the legitimacy to rule all of China has been substantially transformed. Nowadays, Taiwan has neither the means nor the political will to continue the so-called “chequebook diplomacy” to prevent its allies switching to Beijing’s side. And it no longer claims to be the legitimate government of what constitutes the People’s Republic of China.
In the past, losing allies was a sensitive topic in Taiwan, and had a considerable psychological impact. However, as diplomatic recognition for Taiwan has gradually been reduced to a handful of smaller countries, the relative importance of those relationships has decreased. The Taiwanese public has also grown increasingly cynical and started to question whether the funds set aside to ensure this recognition was money well spent.
Beijing’s endgame is well known: absorption of what is considered a “lost territory” into the People’s Republic, no matter how forcefully Taiwan’s populace is opposed to it. Going after Taipei’s diplomatic recognition seems logical. The example of the Dominican Republic shows that Beijing does not even have to try too hard.
Taking away Panama or the Dominican Republic has only a marginal impact on the nature of Taiwan’s unofficial relationships. Forcing Japan to turn against Taiwan is something that would hurt Taipei. However, for all the power that Beijing has accumulated and the energy it commits to the task of Taiwan’s international marginalisation, Japan is firmly out of its reach.
Objectively speaking, with no “diplomatic allies” left, the Republic of China would have lost any semblance of external recognition. However, that would not necessarily undermine its claim to statehood: external recognition is not a prerequisite for statehood, as defined by the Montevideo Convention of 1933. Having a territory, a population, and a political authority is.
The Republic of China would still be a sovereign state even with no diplomatic recognition. However, Beijing understands that the symbolism of stripping Taipei of diplomatic recognition matters more than the objective reality of international law.
The trouble with such an approach is that, by the time it happens, there will be no one in Taiwan who would care. Taiwan has been dealing with disappearing diplomatic support long enough to be able to secure other ways and means of external engagement. Countries that maintain close unofficial relations with Taiwan are not going to change their course based on the recent and future derecognitions.
Moreover, the resources that Taipei allocated to preserve ties with Panama or the Dominican Republic could and should be used to boost public diplomacy outreach that would bypass old-fashioned diplomatic ways.
Beijing may think that, by removing Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition, it is killing Taipei’s will to resist its demands. Instead, its attempt to gradually eliminate Taipei from the international arena will only fuel indifference in Taiwan and prompt unofficial allies to find other ways to secure Taiwan’s standing.
Michal Thim is a Taiwan analyst at the Association for International Affairs (Czech Republic) and a fellow of the Metropolitan Society for International Affairs (US)