China’s soft power in the Middle East is growing, but it is unlikely to cut the Israel-Palestine Gordian knot

China played only a small role in the Saudi-Iran talks and can hardly expect to reproduce that success with Israel, a staunch US ally
Moreover, China lacks historical expertise in the region, cannot force Israel to the table and so can expect peace talks to take years to even mature

Mohammed Sinan SiyechandNabeel Khan

Published: 8:15am, 23 Jun 2023

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When Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas met Xi Jinping in Beijing, the Chinese president proposed a three-point solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The proposal called for an independent Palestine based on 1967 borders, increased development and humanitarian aid for Palestinians, and the facilitating of long-term peace talks through larger-scale international meetings.

China’s new active role in Middle East diplomacy is boosting its soft power. Its recent success in mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia has given Xi’s meeting with Abbas more global importance. The move is also a clear challenge to US hegemony.

If Beijing manages to solve the complex conflict in the Middle East, it would show the world it can succeed where the US has failed. Ultimately, this could be a major boost towards China establishing itself as the regional hegemon.

In a report last year, China said it rejected the idea of a power vacuum in the Middle East, and believed the region’s people were the masters of their future. Beijing does seem to be acting accordingly, as it can be argued, for example, that it was the key players in the Middle East that sought out China’s involvement, rather than vice versa.

The US has faltered in meeting the interests of at least one important Middle East stakeholder. As the security-for-oil deal becomes less relevant and US influence fades, long-time ally and regional power Saudi Arabia has initiated new commercial ties with China.

By brokering the Saudi-Iran peace treaty, China is viewed in some quarters as having improved regional security more effectively than the US. Palestine has grown tired of the US insistence on a two-state solution and the lack of action towards Israel, which the Palestinians see as their aggressors.

For Israel, the Saudi-Iran peace deal is a major problem. Iran is a long-time security threat and its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia threatens Israel’s normalisation of relations with Riyadh – a key US strategic objective. China’s peacemaking has effectively obstructed this. With Iran no longer a threat, Saudi Arabia has lost the security incentive to ally with Israel.

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Saudi Arabia. Some commentators see this as an alarmed response to China’s mediation. The US has been hoping Saudi Arabia will sign up to the Abraham Accords and join several other Arab states in normalising relations with Israel.

Riyadh has been hesitating, largely because its terms on Palestine have yet to be sufficiently addressed by the US. China’s engagement in the region has stirred the political pot.

Given China’s success in the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, some might expect Beijing to achieve the same with the Israel-Palestinian issue, especially because the Palestinians are tired of US support for Israel and now appear to be placing their confidence in China. But there are a few caveats when trying to contextualise China’s role in this issue.

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Chinese President Xi Jinping offers Palestinian leader a ‘lasting solution’ to conflict with Israel

First, China played only a small part in the Saudi-Iran deal. Much of the negotiation was done by Oman and Iraq several years before the announcement of the resumption of Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties. As some have argued, letting China host the final talks was a costless favour to Beijing on the part of the two countries.

There is no guarantee this could repeat itself with the Israel-Palestine issue. This is because the Israel-Palestine conflict is largely asymmetrical – Israel is the much stronger power with less to lose from maintaining the status quo.

China’s engagement here is also not of great value to Israel. Moreover, despite China’s large economic footprint in the region and potential for business, the US has invested over US$150 billion in Israel since its formation and has protected it from regional threats by helping it develop advanced defence capacities.

Israel will not risk its special relationship with the US. Indeed, the US had asked Israel in 2020 to reduce Chinese investment in the nation, thus blocking China’s growth in that country.

Why would China want to replace the US in the Middle East?

China also does not have the expertise that actors like the US – despite its preferential approach towards Israel – have accrued over the last half-century or so. In addition, China will have to invest significant time and money now to host the peace talks, which will take a few years at least to mature.

Lastly, China cannot force Israel to the table, given that its major foreign policy plank – and attraction to authoritarian governments in the Middle East – is its unwillingness to interfere in domestic affairs of any nation.

Against this backdrop, China’s willingness to step up can be explained by a few factors. Firstly, it is riding on the success of the Iran-Saudi deal. Secondly, it is presenting itself as a competitor to the US presence in the region, and here it seems to have succeeded, thus alarming US officials. Thirdly, it can tap into vast economic possibilities if it can show credibility even if the mediation fails.

Despite these factors, though, the likelihood of a successful Israel-Palestine negotiation is modest and it remains to be seen if China can achieve peace in the region. For now, it is more likely that China will secure small wins for Palestine in the conflict, rather than making any major headway.

Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a doctoral candidate at the Islamic and Middle East Studies Department at the University of Edinburgh and a non-resident associate fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Nabeel Khan is a research writer for the Better Conflict Bulletin. He holds an MSc from the London School of Economics specialising in conflict, media and political communications