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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Christopher Tang
Christopher Tang

How Biden’s foreign and trade policy flip-flops are confusing US allies

  • Statements on Taiwan, the US-China relationship and trade in the Indo-Pacific are creating confusion and mistrust
  • Biden needs a decisive strategy to keep his allies and supporters on board, something he could learn from Kissinger and other political realists
US President Joe Biden faces many international challenges, such as reducing US dependence on China, managing South China Sea disputes, supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion and the backlash over his stance on Israel. These issues are reminiscent of America’s geopolitical dilemmas during the Cold War, when Henry Kissinger was a key figure in shaping diplomatic and strategic relations.

Can Biden learn from Kissinger’s approach? The answer depends on what kind of legacy Biden wants. His foreign policies seem to lack coherence and direction, and he needs to articulate a clear and consistent strategy to the world.

History is the ultimate judge of political leaders, and Kissinger is no different. Immediately after the death of the former US secretary of state at 100, he was hailed in the press as a brilliant statesman and also condemned as a shameless war criminal, loathed and loved, reviled and revered.
Kissinger is widely regarded as a realist in international relations, influenced by thinkers such as Thucydides and Machiavelli. Realism is a theoretical framework that emphasises the absence of a central authority above the state and the constraints of politics imposed by national interest.
Kissinger is credited for maintaining America’s powerful reputation – a vital national interest during the Cold War. For instance, as the Cultural Revolution in China was ending, he paid a clandestine visit to Beijing in 1971 to set up the historical meeting between US president Richard Nixon and Chinese leader Mao Zedong in 1972. This paved the path for the US to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing.

Kissinger may not have agreed with communism, but he thought that establishing ties with China was a reasonable compromise; it would allow the US to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, strengthening America’s influence in Asia.

Like Kissinger, Biden is seen as a realist. But unlike Kissinger, who served as secretary of state for four years, Biden has had a long political career spanning 36 years in the senate, eight years as vice-president, and as president since 2021. With nearly five decades of experience of working with different parties, Biden has become a pragmatist who can adapt to the constraints of those institutions with diverse political interests.

But, in a polarised political climate, securing bipartisan support has been a major hurdle for Biden in articulating his geopolitical strategy and making decisions. Many Asian leaders are puzzled or dismayed by Biden’s inconsistencies.

First, the United States has a long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. Under the act, the US does not commit to Taiwan’s defence, instead pledging to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character”. Given this, Beijing was irritated when Biden said on television last year that the US would defend Taiwan from a PLA military assault.
The inconsistency between Biden’s statement and official White House policy is perplexing, even contradictory. To subtly probe Biden’s position during their meeting last month in California, Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed his resolve to unify with Taiwan but avoided mentioning the possibility of force. In response, Biden toed the line based on the long-standing Taiwan Relations Act.

30:18

Why Taiwan is a ‘life-or-death question’ for China: Cui Tiankai on US-China tension

Why Taiwan is a ‘life-or-death question’ for China: Cui Tiankai on US-China tension
The Biden-Xi orchestrated meeting proceeded smoothly, but ended with a shock when Biden called Xi a dictator. This was not only impolite but also confusing, especially when the US wants to manage its relationship with China.

Second, while the US wants to become less dependent on China, Biden’s trade policy has been confusing, sending mixed signals to China and other Asian countries.

To pivot away from China, former president Barack Obama wanted the US to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 11 other countries in the Asia-Pacific. But his successor, Donald Trump, withdrew from the pact as soon as he took office in 2017.
Yet Biden, despite being a prime player in the effort to pass the trade pact as Obama’s vice-president, has not joined the successor to the pact, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. His decision could be due to strong opposition from Congress, but such flip-flops can create confusion at best and mistrust at worst.

Can US focus on Asia-Pacific while distracted by Ukraine, Middle East conflicts?

Instead, Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in May last year with a dozen partners across the Indo-Pacific, including India. Four key pillars make up the economic framework: trade facilitation, the establishment of supply chains, the improvement of infrastructure and decarbonisation, and taxation and anti-corruption.

Unlike the Trans-Pacific Partnership, there are no market access or tariff reduction provisions in the framework, which lacks the trade incentives that regional partners desire. Indeed, many IPEF members want to establish a strong trade relationship with the US to counterbalance their economic ties with China.

11:11

CPTPP could become game changer and supplant 'out-of-date' WTO, after mainland China, Taiwan apply

CPTPP could become game changer and supplant 'out-of-date' WTO, after mainland China, Taiwan apply

But without an explicit commitment towards developing trade incentives, many regional partners see the IPEF as essentially a political strategy to counter China, rather than a sincere and thoughtful economic policy integration initiative in Asia. Experts are also doubtful that it can succeed in reshaping China’s economic influence in the region.

Despite having finalised an agreement with 13 other countries on three IPEF pillars (supply chains, climate and anti-corruption), Biden decided not to sign any trade agreements at the Apec summit in November due to resistance from some Senate members.
Many IPEF members were confused by Biden’s decision because they were expecting progress on the trade section of the framework. Besides confusion, IPEF members also have doubts about Biden’s commitment to improve trade with members.

In politics, flip-flops create confusion and mistrust. Biden needs a decisive strategy to keep his allies and supporters on board – a key lesson from Machiavelli, who may have influenced Kissinger’s realist thinking.

Christopher Tang is a distinguished professor at the UCLA Anderson School of Management

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