China’s inaction over Red Sea shipping attacks could exact a high price

China has not joined a US-led effort to counter Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, although inflation from shipping disruptions hurts the Global South
Beijing appears to be engaged in geopolitical manoeuvres rather than prioritising regional security

Asma Khalid

Published: 9:30am, 24 Dec 2023

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As the United States and its allies grapple with a wave of attacks on commercial ships by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, China is conspicuously absent from international efforts to protect shipping in the Red Sea.

US-led efforts so far have focused on defensive actions, intercepting Houthi drones and missiles on ships near the Yemeni coast, even as a diplomatic outreach is under way. The US is reportedly even considering joint military strikes to cripple the base of the Iranian-backed Houthis but remains wary of igniting a wider conflict in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia, which is negotiating a peace deal with the Houthis after being embroiled in Yemen’s civil war for years, has no desire to upend its fragile ceasefire.

As shipping in the Red Sea continues to be disrupted, the US wants China to leverage its influence with Iran to resolve the Houthi conflict.

Since the Israel-Gaza war broke out, Chinese officials have held several meetings with their Iranian counterparts to prevent the conflict from widening – Iran also backs Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based militant group with a history of border skirmishes with Israeli forces. At a meeting earlier this month, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian accused the US, the key supporter of Israel, of not fully understanding the risks of escalation.

In response to Israel’s military assault on Gaza, Iranian-backed forces have carried out various attacks. Particularly alarming are those from the Houthis, who have fired drones and missiles at or seized over a dozen shipping vessels linked to more than 35 countries. They have pledged to attack any ship heading to Israeli ports unless a humanitarian ceasefire is achieved and aid provided to Gaza residents.

Major shipping companies, including China’s Cosco, have diverted commercial traffic away from the Red Sea or stopped using the route, which is a gateway to Egypt’s Suez Canal and normally carries up to 12 per cent of global trade.

The alternative route via the Cape of Good Hope adds 10 days to the Asia-Europe journey and is causing a spike in shipping and energy costs. The situation adversely affects countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, which are highly dependent on the Suez Canal for their Asia trade. The supply chain disruption is also delaying shipments, and causing insurance premiums and freight charges to rise, which could push up inflation.

Yet China, with its significant security and economic interests in the region, is not part of efforts to stop the Houthi shipping attacks.

Although China has a military base in the Red Sea nation of Djibouti meant to counter piracy and terrorism, there is no evidence of Chinese warships being deployed in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Beijing has also remained silent on the Houthi attacks.

When it comes to the Israel-Gaza conflict, China’s narrative is to advocate a ceasefire and two-state solution, projecting its alignment with Arab and Muslim countries.

But this stance lacks depth and relevance against the nuanced perspectives in Arab capitals, notably Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, where leaders also grapple with the violent threat of Iranian-backed groups like the Houthis.

While Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Cairo have not explicitly supported the US-led maritime task force against the Houthis, it is reasonable to assume they would at least favour a multilateral defensive action against this terrorist threat.

Diplomacy is preferred but the patience of these Arab nations can easily run out in the face of unrelenting Houthi attacks on their seaborne trade – they may eventually feel the need to support a military strike on the Houthis in Yemen. China’s inaction would be judged.

Analysts, such as Andrew Scobell of the US Institute of Peace, attribute China’s inaction to extreme risk aversion and a lack of real influence over the conflicting parties – Houthis, Hamas, Israel. This leads to what Ahmed Aboudouh of the Atlantic Council calls “anti-Western neutrality”: maintaining neutrality towards any actor undermining Western centrality in the world order.

With Hamas and the Houthis drawing American attention in the Middle East, Washington’s strategic focus could move away from the South and East China seas, giving Beijing the time and space to assert its influence in the region’s disputed maritime areas.

While China’s stance on Israel’s indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza partially aligns with the diplomatic approaches favoured by Arab and Islamic countries, Beijing has shown no indication that it endorses the Arab nations’ opposition to the militaristic approach of Iran-backed groups.

China may criticise the US for turning the Middle East into a geopolitical arena but it appears to be equally engaged in geopolitical manoeuvres against the US rather than prioritising regional security.

Food or fight? Asia’s supply chains at risk amid Red Sea attacks

For China to show leadership in the Global South and through its much-touted Global Security Initiative, it should condemn the threat posed by the Houthis to maritime security, recognising the severe implications for Arab and African economies.

Even if it avoids supporting the US-led naval task force in the Red Sea, Beijing should engage in diplomacy with Iran and its regional proxies to prevent actions that have adverse economic consequences for the people of the Global South. Inflation ultimately hurts ordinary people as businesses transfer their costs to consumers.

For China, undermining American credibility and diverting its political and military resources away from the Western Pacific region is coming across as more important than doing what it can to address the economic consequences of the shipping disruptions for countries and people in the Global South.

Asma Khalid is an independent researcher and former visiting fellow at the Stimson Centre