Has 2047 arrived early for Hong Kong’s electoral politics? Having created functional constituencies to ensure safe hands would dominate the Legislative Council in the final years of British rule, the departing colonial authorities opened a few seats to direct election and infused the legislature with a sense of importance, such as by introducing governor’s question time.
Beijing was willing to let Hong Kong experiment with elections then. It assumed that by 2007, a decade after the transition, Hong Kong people would have become used to Chinese sovereignty, and national security would have been assured through the passage of Article 23 of the Basic Law, which required Hong Kong to pass legislation to prohibit treason, secession, subversion, theft of state secrets and ties with foreign political bodies.
The mass protests against Article 23 in 2003 set the stage for the fraught relationship between Beijing and Hong Kong. While Beijing focused on Hong Kong’s unwillingness to pass Article 23, Hong Kong wanted democracy without addressing Beijing’s national security concerns.
The first political earthquake was the Basic Law interpretation in 2004, without prior announcement, which ruled out further electoral advances for the 2007 chief executive and 2008 Legco polls, and pushed the next opportunity to the 2017 chief executive election. In Beijing’s view, Hong Kong was not yet ready for universal suffrage.
The issue of national security never went away. It cropped up from time to time and the discussion was tied to loyalty – or “patriotism”. Notwithstanding Beijing’s concerns, it offered in 2014 that the chief executive be elected by universal suffrage in 2017 upon nomination by a committee.
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‘We do not want unpatriotic people in our political system,’ says Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam
‘We do not want unpatriotic people in our political system,’ says Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam
There could be two to three candidates and they must “love the country and love Hong Kong”. In other words, there has to be a vetting process to ensure candidates’ loyalty in the sense that they support Chinese sovereignty and would not confront the central authorities. Beyond that, the candidates could have very different policy leanings.
This was a significant concession. It was the first time the Beijing leadership was willing to allow universal suffrage in an important part of the country, with a process to ensure loyalty.
The complaint then by pro-democracy politicians and “umbrella movement” activists who also demanded democracy was that the offer was not good enough – they asserted that anyone should be able to stand in a “free election”.
As the proposal was rejected, electoral reform in Hong Kong was essentially off the table for Beijing, although opposition politicians and groups demanded that it be revived immediately. That was the smouldering backdrop to Hong Kong-Beijing relations in 2015.
Hong Kong pro-democracy lawmakers ejected during chaotic Legco session
Opposition politicians and activists never considered the national stage upon which their actions were viewed, such as filibustering in the legislature, showing contempt for the nation when taking the legislative oath of office, and displaying insulting behaviour when the Chinese anthem was played.
US-China relations had entered a new phase of conflict by 2018, signalling shifts in geopolitical tensions. Beijing’s sensitivities that Western powers would try to destabilise China through its periphery, including in Hong Kong, were heightened.
The violent protests of 2019 sealed Hong Kong’s fate. Pro-democracy politicians and activists lobbied foreign governments to sanction Hong Kong and the mainland. The result was a second earthquake – passage of the national security law in Beijing last June to ban secession, subversion, collusion with foreign forces, and terrorism.
As Beijing cannot do away with elections altogether, it has redefined election rules based on “patriots as the main body” in governing Hong Kong, to “improve governance”. Loyalty to the country has become crucial in politics because trust is a serious problem.
Improved governance means the end of filibustering to disrupt legislative work, or using an election to bring down the government as envisaged by activists of the “35-plus” strategy, who planned to win legislative seats to implement a policy of mutual destruction.
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‘We must recalibrate’: Hong Kong opposition considers next move after arrests and political changes
‘We must recalibrate’: Hong Kong opposition considers next move after arrests and political changes
Beijing, unlike governments in Western liberal systems, does not view such activities as examples of freedom of expression. It sees them as an attack on the heart of “one country, two systems”.
Beijing’s repeated emphasis on patriotism means it is prepared to eliminate risks so Hong Kong cannot challenge either “one country” – a unitary state ruled by the Communist Party – or the structure of the special administrative region under “two systems”.
Hence, a third earthquake. There will be a new enlarged Election Committee packed with loyalists to ensure candidates standing in the chief executive and Legco elections pass the patriot test, while the national security law deters activists from crossing political red lines.
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Two sessions: China’s parliament plans an overhaul of Hong Kong’s electoral system
Two sessions: China’s parliament plans an overhaul of Hong Kong’s electoral system
Hong Kong’s pursuit of democracy since the 1980s has come to this sorry state. Hong Kong people believed that having a representative system would bring about local leaders who could speak for them to Beijing to maintain their liberal way of life after 1997.
The opposition voiced many frustrations but did not develop the political wherewithal to build trust with Beijing or a situation where loyalty is not in dispute so Hong Kong could create a space for democratic experiments.
Political systems and conventions are human constructs. Representative systems have authoritarian elements, and authoritarian systems have democratic practices. The route to shaping a workable governance system with elections before 2047 – when one country, two systems is set to expire – may well be through the route of moderation.
Christine Loh, a former undersecretary for the environment, is an adjunct professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
