India shouldn’t make Bangladesh pick sides between it and China
- Bangladesh has the potential to be an arena for cautious India-China engagement and coexistence, in contrast to how New Delhi views Beijing’s ties with Islamabad
- Such a complementary approach could work well for all, providing Bangladesh with greater prosperity and development
As of 2017, India’s total two-way trade with Bangladesh was less than US$7 billion – half the figure between Bangladesh and China.
This level of trade and investment is unlikely to be matched by India any time soon.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh has established robust military ties with China in recent years, emerging as the second biggest importer of Chinese arms between 2011 and 2015. In total, one-fifth of China’s military exports are now bought by Dhaka – including two diesel-powered Type 035 submarines in 2016 for “friendly” prices that raised eyebrows in New Delhi.
India might feel that naval cooperation between Bangladesh and China is making for a very “crowded” Bay of Bengal.
And while India is wary of Dhaka improving its security ties with Beijing, as Islamabad has, it should not let this detract from seeking a cooperative Bangladesh-India-China relationship.
The reality is that Beijing has much deeper pockets than Delhi, and thanks in part to the latter’s belt and road project almost all South Asian nations have a large Chinese footprint in their trade and investment portfolio, as well as their military inventories.
Given its smaller economy and lack of significant military export base, India is not seen as a credible alternative by its neighbours.
At the end of the day, India will have to accept a certain Chinese presence in Bangladesh and avoid forcing Dhaka into choosing between the two Asian giants.
In the past, Hasina has indicated that her government would like the “space” to engage with all major Asian powers and Delhi ought to enable this kind of regional multilateralism.
Bangladesh has the potential to be an arena for cautious India-China engagement and coexistence, in contrast with the zero-sum game that has played out in Pakistan.
Such a complementary approach could, in the best case scenario, work well for all – providing Bangladesh with greater prosperity and moving it up to developing nation status. It would also serve as an example to emulate for Pakistan, which is currently beleaguered by a host of challenges.
China under Xi has lofty ambitions and these could be better realised if the Sino-Indian relationship were less uneasy and discordant than it is now. Bangladesh offers an opportunity for China to demonstrate that smaller South Asian neighbours do not have to make binary choices and can engage with India in a manner they deem appropriate.
The long term gain for Beijing is that Bangladesh could be the arena where China and India cautiously learn to cooperate – something they do not in a tangible manner in any other sector.
But whether such strategic perspicacity and prudence will prevail depends on the outcome of the meeting between Modi and Xi later this month.