Looking to 2020 for India, Indonesia, the Koreas and US-China tensions: the expert view
- Unrest in Hong Kong, tussles between Washington and Beijing over tech and trade, a surge in Hindu nationalism – after the conflict and volatility that marked 2019, Shashi Tharoor and three other commentators offer predictions for trends likely to impact Asia in the year ahead
This is the first in a two-part series, with the second part coming on December 29
SHASHI THAROOR
Current Indian MP and former United Nations communications head
India will look with interest at how the situation between Beijing and Hong Kong evolves. Will “one country, two systems” work, permitting a lively democracy to flourish in the former colony? Will Hong Kong’s rebelliousness ignite similar revolts elsewhere in China? Or will China crack down definitively and impose authoritarian control, undermining its own soft power around the world?
Closer to home, the subcontinent presents a large number of problems, many caused by the domestic belligerence of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party government, animated by its sectarian Hindutva ideology which risks accentuating major internal divisions and provoking disruptions. Tensions with Pakistan are high and show no sign of being defused; the risk that they may worsen and erupt even into conflict, perhaps over Kashmir or in reaction to another cross-border terrorist attack, cannot be discounted.
While the South Asian subcontinent is otherwise at peace, there is understandable disgruntlement in Bangladesh and Afghanistan about the way their countries have been demonised by India’s government in justifying its controversial Citizenship Amendment Bill.
Altogether, the prospects are uncertain, and in many areas, worrying.
EVAN LAKSAMANA
Senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta
Second, to what extent will the major political parties treat Jokowi as a “lame duck” president as they prepare for the 2024 general elections? While Jokowi seems committed to boosting foreign investments and beefing up infrastructure spending, he has also accommodated too many political party officials and interests in his new cabinet. But the major parties are more interested in running their own agenda, from weakening anti-corruption efforts, amending the constitution to what it was during Indonesia’s authoritarian days, or simply extracting state resources for their own coffers. The ensuing deterioration of the country’s democratic quality and state capacity will further weaken its regional and global standing.
Third, to what extent will Indonesia’s defence diplomatic engagement keep up with the military’s organisational expansion and arms spree? The military has been creating new units and regional commands over the past few years – many of which are located in the eastern part of Indonesia. The expansion remains driven by internal personnel problems like promotional logjams, but will have significant implications for civil-military relations and regional security.
Defence minister Prabowo Subianto has also vowed to rein in corruption in the defence sector and boost spending for hardware procurement. But without expanding existing defence diplomatic engagement or opening new venues of cooperation, such policies might raise the strategic temperature in Indonesia’s regional environment.
JUNG PAK
Senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies
As a result, a return to a confrontational US-North Korea relationship is more likely in 2020, with an increased potential for more provocative and aggressive North Korean actions, followed by critical US and UN responses – which, in turn, will be used as an excuse by Pyongyang to conduct additional demonstrations of its military capabilities. Kim’s harsh rhetoric, refusal to invest in substantive working-level discussions with the US on the nuclear issue, and its open disdain for South Korea and rebuffing of President Moon Jae-in’s repeated efforts at inter-Korean engagement have laid bare the hollowness and fragility of the summitry of 2018 and 2019.
Kim’s next moves would be designed to show his resoluteness and the North’s advancing military capabilities, while testing the willingness and ability of Washington and the international community to cooperate on a united response to Pyongyang’s aggressiveness. China and Russia are likely to continue calling for a lifting of sanctions, so we should anticipate significant obstacles to US efforts to secure leverage to press Pyongyang toward denuclearisation.
Trump’s open derision for alliances and exorbitant demands in burden-sharing negotiations probably will continue to put additional stresses on US relationships with key allies South Korea and Japan, undermining Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy and reducing its ability to deter and contain the North Korean threat.
On a potentially brighter note, South Korea-Japan ties might improve. If North Korea steps up its belligerent moves, possibly resuming testing of longer-range ballistic missiles or a nuclear weapon, Seoul and Tokyo would be more inclined to cooperate on security matters, as they had in previous periods of Pyongyang’s provocations.
YUN SUN
Senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia programme and director of the China programme at the Stimson Centre
While Beijing and Washington are on a foreign-policy collision course, the root of this situation is in their domestic politics – which do not look too positive, either. For the US, China will be the top strategic issue in the 2020 election season, inviting further scrutiny, criticism and debate. Meanwhile, domestic politics in China has unfortunately done extremely little to reassure the US and the rest of the region. This year has been marked by the chaos in Hong Kong, a deterioration in relations with Taiwan, and controversies in Xinjiang and Tibet – none of which are likely to improve in 2020.
We’re hoping the top leaders in the US and China will wake up to the problems and pursue a change. Whether that affords much hope is a different question.