Jonathan Berkshire Miller, director and senior fellow on Indo-Pacific at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, an Ottawa-based think tank, said Canada “has been late to the game when it comes to the Indo-Pacific and developing a strategic approach”.

“We shouldn’t look at security challenges in the region as peripheral to Canadian interests. The reality is that Canada has important stakes in a stable region governed by rules and norms,” Miller said.

However, Yan Liang, professor of economics at Willamette University in Oregon said the sending of the Canadian warship to the region was “pointless and counterproductive” as Canada has no strategic interest in Taiwan.

“This move amounts to a needless provocation that does not help advance regional stability, and it risks making unintentional errors that could lead to catastrophic consequences,” Liang said.

Growing Canadian voices in countering China

In September Beijing released Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor – detained for almost three years for spying, a charge both had denied – after Huawei Technologies Co. chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou was allowed to return to China.

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Hero’s welcome for Meng Wanzhou at Huawei offices in China after extradition battle and quarantine

Hero’s welcome for Meng Wanzhou at Huawei offices in China after extradition battle and quarantine

In December 2018 Canada detained Meng – accused of fraud and conspiracy to circumvent American sanctions against Iran – acting on an extradition request by the US.

Soon after the release of the two Michaels, Canada’s ambassador to Beijing, Dominic Barton, visited Washington and met with Indo-Pacific officials at the US National Security Council, prompting the Canadian media to report that the US wants a better sense of where its allies, including Canada, stand on China issues.

In the congratulatory note by Canada to Japan’s new prime minister Fumio Kishida, Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau mentioned “Indo-Pacific” twice in stressing the importance of cooperating with Japan on shared regional interests.

Despite Canada’s traditionally strong ties in the Indo-Pacific region, the country has not publicly put forward a strategy for it, prompting many to suggest that Ottawa is not pulling its weight on defending the rules-based international order.

A report by the National Post newspaper in May said Canada has been drawing up an Indo-Pacific strategy since April 2019 but has been muted about making it public mainly due to worries over upsetting China.

In a senate hearing in September this year, David Cohen, then US ambassador-designate to Canada, said he and other allies are awaiting Trudeau’s China policy, while within Canada, the Conservative opposition has called on the ruling Liberals to release such a document as well.

Wang Shouwen, China’s vice-minister for commerce, said last week that Meng’s return to China tore down the “biggest hurdle” between China and Canada, but urged Ottawa to “create conditions to put bilateral ties back on track”.

A Canadian Indo-Pacific strategy?

Stephen Nagy, a Tokyo-based research fellow for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said Canada needs an Indo-Pacific Strategy as part of its foreign policy given its “deep-seated interest” in the sea lines of communication between the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Canada has a stake in ensuring that these “remain stable, prosperous and arbitrated by international law” as around US$20 billion go through these regions annually.

China is Canada’s third largest trade partner, after the US and the EU, and despite the global pandemic, bilateral trade increased by 19.9 per cent in the first half of this year.

While the release of the two Michaels has given Canada “a growing space for developing and promoting a bigger role within the Indo Pacific”, Nagy said this does not necessarily mean a tougher posture towards China.

Instead, it means “a more engaged, cooperative, and collaborative approach to recent partnerships, such as the Quad”, he said. The Quad is the informal security alliance of the US, India, Australia and Japan.

It also means “articulating a clear position on issues within the region”, Nagy added.

Ottawa is also likely to continue its naval activities in the region and increase its number of transits through the Taiwan Strait and likely through the South China Sea, Nagy noted, pointing out that there is likely to be greater ad hoc cooperation within the Quad in the form of “a Quad plus cooperation”, which means contributing either as an observer or as an external exercise partner in maritime activities in the region.

Xi-Asean summit boosts China’s plan to upgrade Southeast Asia ties to comprehensive strategic partnership

Canada is also looking to boost ties with Indonesia, according to a joint publication last month between the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Strategy Agency.

Asean ‘reservations’

However, the idea of yet another major power flexing its military and diplomatic muscle in the region is met with guarded responses from analysts in the region, many of whom fear that the regional arms race which is already well under way will intensify. From Australia to India to South Korea, countries in the region have ramped up efforts to acquire and test new defence systems.

Rifki Dermawan, an international relations lecturer at Indonesia’s Andalas University in West Sumatra said that the involvement of more actors in the region is likely to challenge Asean centrality, referring to the central role in multinational frameworks of the region played by the regional grouping.

“With the involvement of Canada, it adds to the list of countries which have given particular concern to the Indo-Pacific,” Dermawan said, adding that regional tensions are likely to be heightened.

Jefferson Ng, senior analyst at the Indonesia Programme at Singapore’s Rajaratnam School of International Studies said Jakarta is likely to be wary of any efforts by US allies to entangle Indonesia and Asean in situations “that are contrary to the principle of promoting an inclusive regional architecture in Southeast Asia”.

“Indonesian leaders want foreign countries to engage with Indonesia and Asean based on its own merits rather than because of any attempt to co-opt them into a larger balancing coalition against China,” Ng said.

Acknowledging Asean centrality in any Indo-Pacific vision, Nagy said Canada’s policy is expected to take into account the concerns of regional countries.

“While still in the making, Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy is likely to focus on developmental issues, security issues, and economic issues through the lens of institution building, inclusive development and working with like-minded countries.”

This, Nagy said, will ensure that the region remains “rules based, transparent, sustainable and governed by a shared set of norms of behaviour”.

Liang, from Willamette University in the US, said that given US pressure, Canada is likely to elevate “rhetoric toughness” on China, which includes Trudeau’s mention of “Indo-Pacific” rather than the traditional term of “Asia-Pacific”.

“I don’t think Canada will escalate tensions at a substantive level,” Liang said, adding that Ottawa is also unlikely to push the envelope too far and break ties with China, pointing out that there is great potential for even deeper economic partnership between the two countries.

“Trudeau will want to find the middle path between the United States and China,” Liang noted.