Why public calls for China to rein in North Korea risk backfiring

On the balmy Saturday of May 13, 1950, a private train carrying North Korean leader Kim Il-sung arrived quietly in Beijing.

Kim, who grew up in China and joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1931, had not visited Beijing since returning to Korea in 1945. He was on a secret mission to meet Mao Zedong ( 毛澤東 ) and inform the Chinese his decision to unite Korea by force.

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Unlike his meeting with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin a month earlier, Kim did not come to discuss the war plan or seek Mao’s approval. Kim “released no details of his military plan, let alone the date of the action”, according to the Chinese’ memo of the meeting. He simply told Mao that Stalin had approved his plan to attack the south. The Chinese leader listened stoically and then asked Kim what possible response he expected from the United States.

“The possibility of American intervention cannot be ruled out, but the war will be over in two to three weeks. It will be too quick for them to do anything,” said a confident Kim. When Mao offered three Chinese armies to help Pyongyang, Kim responded “arrogantly” (in Mao’s words) that the North Koreans could solve the problem by themselves.

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Kim’s move could not have come at a worse time for Beijing. Mao was a keen supporter of using force to spread communism to Korea and Vietnam, but he hoped to do so after finishing off the Chinese civil war and conquering Taiwan. Earlier that year, the Chinese leadership had demobilised 1.4 million ground troops so they could shift war resources to prepare for the Taiwan campaign. The outbreak of the Korean War suddenly changed priorities.