Both are long judgments, showing meticulously the legal thinking which led the judges to their conclusions. They not only serve to educate the public in what might be called 'Bill of Rights thinking', but reveal the fact that judges are learning to master this new kind of thinking.

It thus proves, if proof is necessary, the wisdom of having the Bill of Rights in place well before 1997, because one needs time to test, familiarise oneself with, and adjust to this way of implementing rights.

And the Government must adjust its attitude accordingly. In this regard, the ICAC's response to Mr Sinclair's decision is regrettable. The short statement it released to the press chose to emphasise the fact that a decision of a magistrate's court has no binding effect on other cases, and reiterated that the ICAC was advised that it 'should continue to respond to any alleged or suspected breach of the ordinance in the same manner'.

What it says is that the ICAC will, to all intents and purposes, ignore the decision of the court save asking its legal adviser if it should appeal the decision. Presumably, if it is not appealed against and tested in the appellate court, then the ICAC will go on applying section 30 as before.

This attitude demonstrates how close a powerful branch of the executive may come to regarding itself as above the law. It is precisely to eradicate this kind of attitude that Hong Kong needs the Bill of Rights.

Fundamental in the judgment against Section 30 is the court's refusal to accept an interpretation of it in the widest and most absolute terms. Namely, that any person who discloses 'any details' of 'an investigation in respect of an offence alleged or suspected to have been committed' under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, shall be guilty of an offence, regardless of how important or unimportant the 'detail' is, whether the allegation or suspicion that an offence under the Ordinance has been committed was reasonable or merely a wide speculation, and whether the disclosure has or is likely to have any effect on the investigation.

This is an interpretation that the ICAC itself advocates, and one which has made Section 30 a matter for the deepest concern for all who value freedom of information.

The essence of the judgment is that you can't have a provision as wide as that, which is capable of being irrationally applied, without contravening the Bill of Rights unless you can come up with some pretty strong justification, and there just isn't any for Section 30.

It may be that a court of higher authority and greater experience would question some of the reasoning of the judgment, but there can be no doubt that the decision itself is right. It cannot be right that the ICAC can put a blanket gag on the entire community until an arrest is made or, if no arrest is to be made, until such time as the ICAC pleases, for the vague and general reason that fighting corruption is important.

Since it is unlikely that the ICAC would review Section 30 of its own accord, it is hoped that it will indeed appeal the magistrate's judgment.

The importance of the Lau Shan-ching judgment is the court's decision on the meaning of 'ordinarily resident', correcting the interpretation of the Returning Officer. The second half of the 60-page judgment on the Bill of Rights issue leaves the status of Section 18 (2) uncertain, since having found it inconsistent with the Bill of Rights the judge did not find that section repealed by it.

The question to be decided about Lau Shan-ching is simply this: Should someone be deprived of the right to stand for election on the grounds that he had not been 'ordinarily resident' in Hong Kong for the 10 years immediately preceding his nomination? The layman may be forgiven for thinking that the obvious answer is 'no'. How can someone born in Hong Kong and who has lived here all his life not be 'ordinarily resident' because he was imprisoned in China? The interpretation of 'ordinarily resident' and the Bill of Rights issue are just two prongs of the attack. Once the first question is decided in Lau's favour the problem is at an end.

The Bill of Rights issue is a much more difficult one to decide, and one would seriously doubt the value of documents such as white papers purportedly reporting public response to government's consultation. Nevertheless, these documents are placed before the court.

The public discussion on qualifications for voter and candidate is within living memory. At the most fundamental level, people feel that all 'Hong Kong belongers' should have a vote, and only they should have a vote. It is undoubtedly accepted that such a person must be a permanent resident. By definition, a person who has lived in Hong Kong for seven years or more is a permanent resident. Likewise, someone who is born and bred here, and has a real connection with Hong Kong.

Such a person should not be regarded as having lost that status even though he has chosen to live abroad. Present provisions seem to accord with public sentiment.

IT is also clear that the public felt a candidate must be more assuredly a Hong Kong belonger. One cannot exactly say that public response to details of electoral provisions was very pronounced before the 1981 white paper, but by the time of the Sino-British talks there was certainly passionate public debate. In the atmosphere of that debate, the public particularly did not want to have a mainland person coming here and standing for election on the strength that he was born in Hong Kong, or lived here for a few years.

The 10-year residency requirement immediately prior to nomination was probably a somewhat heavy-handed way to keep such people out.

The real change since the Sino-British negotiations is that the emigration of true Hong Kong belongers who are generally regarded the sort of people who should be encouraged to stand for election has become a trend. Hence the desire to keep out the PRC candidate has to be balanced against the desire to let in the returned immigrant who is by history and by disposition a true Hong Konger.

The difficult question is, supposing this picture to be true and unobjectionable, how to attain that legal effect? There is nothing unjust in that the public wants a candidate's recent connection with Hong Kong to be assured. Indeed, the judgment finds no fault with the principle of an additional residency requirement.

What has not been justified, and therefore found to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, is the 10-year rule, which is felt to be excessive.

However, it is not very clear from the judgment precisely what is the basis for the decision. It seems, at the end of the day, whether certain provisions are justifiable or not in Bill of Rights terms depends very much on what kind of candidate the public really wants, and this must be an extremely difficult question for the court to decide.

The conclusion to draw is that a review with wide public consultation must be made without delay, politically sensitive though it is at this time, and the Lau Shan-ching judgment is as good a point to start as any.