Players in the power game

THE Preliminary Working Committee (PWC) has been synonymous with trouble since it was formed two years ago as a reaction to Britain's go-it-alone democratic reforms. Proposals emerging from the behind-closed-door meetings of the mainland government-appointed body's five sub-groups have often been the source of shock, friction, confusion and, though rarely, relief for a jittery community. Its proposals to set up a provisional legislature lasting up to a year after the handover; to neuter the Bill of Rights and reinstate six harsh colonial laws; and to take July 1, 1997, as the cut-off date for returning emigrants to keep their right of abode, were attacked by a wide spectrum of the community. Dismissed by Governor Chris Patten as a creature with no legal status under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, the 70-strong body has been scorned by some cynics, many of whom are senior officials. The China appointees - 38 of them are local prominent figures - have been condemned as out of step with the community in which many of them live. The PWC has never been considered a propaganda body with the primary objective of winning the hearts and minds of the six million people in Hong Kong. As some PWC members concede, it has been used by Beijing as a weapon in the Sino-British power game in the remaining days of colonial rule. In short, it has served China's interests in questions affecting Hong Kong. Speaking at the fourth plenary session of the PWC in December last year, its chairman, Qian Qichen, underlined the guiding principle of 'relying on our own efforts' in preparing for the handover. He was quick to emphasise that did not mean they did not want to co-operate with Britain. 'Quite the contrary; we welcome co-operation,' he said. Over the past two years the work of the PWC has seen its fair share of controversy and also moves towards greater co-operation. The agenda of PWC meetings is often a carbon copy of the secretive talks of the Joint Liaison Group (JLG). The findings of the PWC sub-groups have been used by Beijing negotiators when bargaining with their British counterparts. The British side are given the choice of agreeing with China on contentious transitional arrangements. Alternatively they face the scenario of China going it alone - in accordance with plans mapped out by PWC members. Such tactics succeeded in some cases, failed in others, while some remain unclear. Despite the statement issued by the PWC that the terms of the three-tier political structure will come to an end on June 30, 1997, the constitutional reforms masterminded by Governor Chris Patten were passed into law in June. But the deal over the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal has often been cited by Chinese officials as a showcase of how the PWC can be of use. It is true that the basket of eight-point proposals formulated by its political sub-group formed part of the JLG agreement on the court. But few dispute the fact that it was a British U-turn - putting the date of the establishment back to July 1, 1997 - which made the deal possible. On another sensitive issue, the right of abode for tens of thousands of emigrants, it remains unclear whether the Chinese Government will formally endorse the cut-off date proposal from the social and security sub-group. The issue is still under discussion in the JLG. With the handover getting ever closer, China is adamant it cannot leave remaining transitional issues entirely to diplomatic talks. The rationale is that even if they cannot work jointly with the British on some issues, they must have their own plans in hand. While part of the PWC's work was tailored to the needs of diplomatic tussles with Britain, it was also designed to secure what China sees as a stable and prosperous Special Administrative Region (SAR). The formation of a provisional legislature is inevitable. But the PWC has been struggling with conflicting needs when giving the interim body enough power to complete the necessary tasks amid public fears of abuse of power. And in spite of its insistence that the existing three-tier political structure will have to be demolished in 1997, there are clear indications that China wants to be more flexible over the future of the two lower tiers of power - district boards and the two municipal councils. Yet Beijing is keen to keep the influence of the Democrats to a minimum in the post-1997 political structure, particularly the legislature. It is hardly likely that core Democratic Party legislators will be appointed to the new powerful bodies, such as the Preparatory Committee, the Selection Committee and the provisional legislature. Chinese officials are convinced the first year of the SAR will be the most sensitive period, in which some measures that might be considered high-handed may be needed. Such fears of political, social and economic instability have prompted the PWC to study a wide range of policies over the past two years. Worried about an exodus of civil servants before the handover, the political sub-group was unconcerned about the adverse impact caused by asking civil servants to give prior notice of whether they want to serve the SAR. The economic sub-group at one stage argued that the existing operation of the Land Fund should continue for an unspecified period after 1997, which they believe will help a smooth transfer. The proposal, however, was withdrawn after fierce criticism that it would go against the Joint Declaration. On the fate of the Bill of Rights, which China sees as a threat to social order, the PWC is prepared to ignore the community's fierce reaction to attempts to water it down. Fortified by Mr Patten's admission that the bill was enacted because of the June 4 killings, Beijing firmly believes that the human rights legislation is merely a tool to make the future SAR less governable. Uppermost in their minds is that a stable social order is above such vague values as civil liberty and protecting human rights in the volatile period immediately after the setting up of the SAR. By the same token, the PWC and Chinese officials are convinced the transitional period is not the right time for drastic and bold social and economic experiments Not even the reclamation of land in the harbour and sensitive topics in school textbooks. While the PWC has not discussed in detail social welfare spending in the territory, the anxieties of Chinese officials over what they see as runaway growth in welfare started a war of words this week. Beijing is worried that the trend will continue with more generous pay-outs by the government to butter up the people in the final days of colonial rule. In the face of deep mistrust between Britain and China, Beijing took the initiative in forming the PWC to represent mainland influence and policy while the enclave was still under British rule. It served Beijing to sound immediate alarm bells over what it saw as problems that needed to be tackled, or addressed at diplomatic level. By doing so, they have come under attack for meddling with the administration - a small price they are prepared to pay. But like it or not, their early findings and proposals offer a clearer picture of what is in store in the remaining period of British rule - and the early days of the SAR.