It seems that the race is over. The horses have run the course although the stewards have not yet posted the official results. But no one at the track has any doubt about the outcome now - first past the post in the Chief Executive Handicap is shipping magnate Tung Chee-hwa. Any lingering doubts about this should be dispelled by the Frank remarks from Louis Cha, China's trusted adviser and a member of the Preparatory Committee. On Friday, the former publisher of Ming Pao surprised many by openly endorsing the candidacy of Mr Tung, tipped to be a front-runner for the chief executive race in the last 10 months. Breaking his promise six months ago that he wouldn't want to comment on individual candidates for the future chief's job before the actual establishment of the Selection Committee, Mr Cha went out of his way to talk about the strengths and weaknesses of the top four candidates, Mr Tung, Chief Secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang, Preparatory Committee members Lo Tak-shing and Sir Sze-yuen Chung. He made it patently clear that the shipping magnate was his favourite choice. Said Mr Cha: 'Mr Tung is very steady and brilliant. His relationships with the business sector are a merit rather than a defect . . . What is extremely important now is to maintain all things unchanged. Mr Tung can increase the chances of that.' 'Hong Kong people like him . . . of the three potential candidates, Hong Kong people may be happier if it is Mr Tung,' Mr Cha said. But for ambitious Mr Lo, Mr Cha was much less enthusiastic. Mr Lo's records in different opinion polls were bad and Hong Kong people did not support him much. China always maintained that the new chief should command popular support in the territory and he did not think Beijing would hand-pick someone Hong Kong people did not like. So this was the judgment Mr Cha delivered on Mr Lo, the self-declared candidate who was believed to have secured the backing of Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng . As for Hong Kong's most popular choice, Mrs Chan, Mr Cha has the following view - she is capable and familiar with Hong Kong, but she knows little about China, the Communist Party and the central government. Similar charges of a lack of knowledge about communist China was also delivered by Mr Cha on Sir Sze-yuen. Mr Cha can claim that his analysis of the candidates represents nothing more than his personal view. Yes, he had earlier said he would rather keep quiet, but in the past six months, he had consulted many people and he was in a better position to understand Hong Kong people's intentions now, Mr Cha explained. But for many in political circles, they would rather read Mr Cha's detailed analysis as not only unofficially declaring the outcome of the chief executive race, but also articulating the thoughts and the decision-making process inside the Chinese leadership. Of course for Beijing, no matter how good Mrs Chan is and how popular she is in Hong Kong, she is still very much a product of the colonial administration. Yes, she has a patriotic grandfather, but so what? At most, she has the faintest idea about communist China. The system with which she is familiar is Western system and the people she stays close to are those educated by Western ideas. To a communist regime Mrs Chan is an outsider. And that is why her present qualifications and credentials, no matter how impressive they have appeared to Hong Kong people, must be a fatal blow to her hopes for elevation in the hierarchy of the Chinese communist regime. Sir Sze-yuen, despite his position in China's advisory hierarchy, is still carrying heavy baggage for being too close to the colonial power, especially at the very sensitive time of the 1982-84 Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong's future. More interesting is Mr Cha's comparison of Mr Lo and Mr Tung. Each is said to have the backing of at least one member of China's Politburo Standing Committee. While Mr Li is said to be backing Mr Lo, President Jiang Zemin is seen to be a keen supporter of the shipping magnate. Mr Cha did not challenge Mr Lo's ability. 'What Mr Lo advocates is not very much different from other people, his problem is his poor human relations. He has some good ideas, but why is his image so bad . . . perhaps it's a question of packaging,' Mr Cha said. So, to the veteran journalist, Mr Lo's biggest problem is his popularity in Hong Kong. While the solicitor and former executive councillor shares a similar background with Sir Sze-yuen for being very close to the colonial administration at one point, he was not described by Mr Cha as having the same problem of political qualification that Sir Sze-yeun still suffers. In other words, in Mr Cha's eye, both Mr Tung and Mr Lo are considered politically correct. And the factor affecting their chances is simply their standing in the local community. Those who know Mr Cha have no doubt that the veteran publisher is a very cautious and careful person. The fact that he is willing to adopt such a high profile on the subject of chief executive would not have been prompted spontaneously. It must have been after detailed careful thought, or perhaps even encouragement by concerned parties, that he broke his silence at a time when the Preparatory Committee was holding its plenary sessions in Beijing. He must have known that it would make headlines. For a conservative and careful person such as Mr Cha, the last thing he would do would be to predict something unlikely to happen or something highly likely to be interpreted by the Chinese leadership as pre-empting their choice or decision. So even if one were to assume Mr Cha's remarks were not prompted by some direct or indirect encouragement by the leadership, it would be safe to say that - given the veteran China adviser's political shrewdness - what he said would reflect very strongly what has been discussed in Zhongnanhai. The hint that one can draw from Mr Cha's open endorsement for Mr Tung is that after months of hard struggle to agree on a candidate, the Beijing leadership must now have settled for a choice. This can be further supported by the fact that after changing the time-table for the formation of the Selection Committee several times, the Preparatory Committee has finally settled on a date for its formal establishment. Unlike previously when they kept delaying the process, this time Beijing officials have decided that advancing the formation of the selection body will be in the best interests of ensuring the smooth process of establishing the first SAR Government. Beijing officials have been at pains to play down the impact of advancing the timetable by two weeks but, for many insiders, the move is seen as reflecting a strong desire within the Chinese leadership to get the chief executive named as soon as possible. While mainland officials may deny it, many in the political arena, including those in the Preparatory Committee, know that the true reason for the delay is that the leaders in Beijing have yet to come up with a consensus on the final choice. Notwithstanding all the fuss and debate about how to return a Selection Committee in a fair and open manner, everybody knows that the winner is fixed before the race. Now that a candidate can be agreed, no time should be allowed for any potential change or damage to be done to the approved candidate. So the formation of the Selection Committee must be advanced to speed up the timetable for the 400-member body to formally 'elect' the future chief. Beijing is ready now, but the trouble is whether Mr Tung is ready. There are only three months for him to put himself to the Hong Kong public, to prove to the community that he deserves the praise secured so far. That will be the real battle for Mr Tung. Act of desperation: Page 10