Of all the inaccurate predictions about 1997, probably the most pervasive has been the near universal expectation that the democratic camp will face political extinction after the handover.
Some, such as author Simon Winchester, made apocalyptic forecasts of bloodbaths, with soldiers opening fire on pro-democracy protesters. Even among mainstream commentators there were widespread predictions that the democrats would be dragged kicking and screaming from the Legislative Council chamber on the night of June 30, and barred from ever standing for election in the Special Administrative Region.
Not even the most optimistic expected that, rather than bloodbaths and confrontations, the final days before the handover would instead see the Democratic Party locked in intensive negotiations with Chief Executive-designate Tung Chee-hwa's office, over the precise shape of their planned protest outside the Legislative Council building.
Nor could anyone ever have anticipated that relations with Beijing would thaw so far that the Chinese leadership would quietly accept some of the democrats' suggestions concerning the People's Liberation Army.
That the Democratic Party and the Chief Executive's Office should now have been reduced to quibbling over whether the party's demonstration - in the early hours of July 1 - takes place from a balcony or a raised platform is a mark of how far the reality of events has diverged from most people's predictions.
Even a few months ago, no one could have foreseen that there would be such a large measure of consensus between the two sides, or that the Chief Executive's office would order the provisional legislature to give the democrats access to the Legco building.
Nor could anyone have predicted that the Democratic Party would not only refrain from organising any protests outside the site of the handover ceremony, but also order their members not to attend those organised by other groups, upon pain of disciplinary action if they disobey.