Since 1984 constitutional issues have dominated public debate in Hong Kong. Presumably, the departure of the British and implementation of the Basic Law after the handover should have put constitutional debate to rest. Yet apparently this has not proved the case. As I see it, Hong Kong in the days ahead - and for a long time to come - will still be beset by a plethora of constitutional issues. First, although Tung Chee-hwa, a politically independent person, was elected as the first Chief Executive of the Special Administrative Region, the Basic Law does not preclude people with political-party affiliations from running for the post. In view of the fact that the election of the next Chief Executive will be done by an 800-strong Election Committee - whose members will be elected by a large numbers of social, economic, political and cultural bodies - it is very likely that only candidates with strong organisational support will be capable of winning the job. It is thus possible that party leaders or politicians supported by political coalitions will be Hong Kong's chief executives in the future. As a result, because of the powers controlled by the chief executive, party government in the future cannot be ruled out. Such a scenario apparently was not foreseen by the Basic Law drafters or by the Chinese government. Nor will it be welcome. Second, if support from political organisations is indispensable for a person to become the next chief executive, the logical sequel to this is that the future administration will be led by a political team which will have functioned for some time before assuming administrative power. It is also very likely that team members will be appointed not only to positions in the Executive Council, but also to be principal officials. This is because the chief executive has to provide political patronage to his supporters to ensure a cohesive leadership core which is loyal, dependable and willing to fight political battles for him. However, in view of the insecurity of a political career in Hong Kong and the lucrative opportunities in the private sector, civil servants in the foreseeable future will still enjoy an edge in getting appointed as principal officials. But after appointment they will no longer be civil servants with security of tenure, and they can no longer monopolise the posts of principal officials. Principal officials will then become bona fide politicians. This scenario implies that a ministerial system will likely be installed in Hong Kong in the future, maybe in 10 years' time. It will inevitably impact on the civil-service system of Hong Kong. Career civil servants will no longer be able to aspire to the few top jobs in the administration. Administrative-grade officers will be particularly affected in the sense that, as generalists 'specialising' in politics and government among civil servants, their superior status within the administration will increasingly be taken over by political appointees who are comrades-in-arms of the chief executive. Professionals and specialists in the civil service accordingly may occupy a more important place in the civil service in the future, but the civil service will in turn be led by a group of politicians. Third, if it is likely that in the future the SAR Government will be headed by a political party or political coalition, then it is also possible for that party or coalition to control a substantial portion of the seats in the Legislative Council. The logic of development in the political system laid down in the Basic Law is that the Government will be tempted to use the powers and resources at its disposal to help or promote political parties that are pro-Government. In the end it is possible that a political party or a political alliance will be formed that not only wins the post of chief executive but also exercises substantial control over the legislature. Such constitutional development is bound to be controversial in society. Fourth, two types of public debate about the electoral methods for the Legislative Council can be expected in the years ahead. The first has to do with the demand to amend the Basic Law before the end of the third Legislative Council in order to accelerate the pace of democratic development in Hong Kong. The second will definitely focus on speeding up Hong Kong's democratic change once the straitjacket imposed by the Basic Law is gone. During the term of office of the third Legco, strong demands are likely to be raised for a fully directly elected legislature. I can also foresee that there will be strong resistance from the business community, the Government and the conservative forces, who will still be concerned about the deterioration of the investment environment of Hong Kong and strained executive-legislative relationship. Political conflicts will be unavoidable. Fifth, compared with the demand for speeding the democratic process in Hong Kong, the demand to 'democratise' the method of electing the chief executive will be milder. But I still expect such a demand to be made. Article 45 of the Basic Law promises that the 'ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures'. This article is bound to raise political aspirations among the pro-democratic sectors of society. However, constitutional debates in the past show that the public generally expects a greater chance of democratic progress in the legislature than in the executive, believing that resistance by the Chinese government and the Hong Kong Government will be very strong to proposals to rapidly 'democratise' the election of the chief executive. Consequently, even though there will be debates about the electoral method [used to select] the chief executive, the possibility that these debates will turn into serious political conflicts is small. Sixth, Article 74 of the Basic Law apparently intends to curb the policy-making power of Legco. It provides that legislators may introduce bills which do not relate to Government expenditure or the political structure or the operation of the Government. But those relating to Government policies cannot be introduced without the chief executive's written consent. Definitely there will be an intense tussle between the executive and the legislature over the precise meaning and implication of this article. Seventh, the structure and functions of the district organisations in Hong Kong will be a subject of public debate not too long in the future. It is worthy of note that the Urban Council, the Regional Council and the district boards are not mentioned in the Basic Law, even though they are understood as 'district organisations' which are governed by articles 97 and 98. This is to say the SAR Government has all the powers to mould and remould district organisations. Since a lot of vested interests will be affected by any attempt to reorganise these bodies and re-orient their roles, political conflicts will definitely erupt. The constitutional issues mentioned above are voluminous enough to overload the public agenda of Hong Kong in the next two decades. Professor Lau, associate director of the Hong Kong Institute of Asian-Pacific Studies, was a member of the Preparatory Committee
