Killer flu investigation file must stay open
During the bird flu crisis I was struck by the level of speculation from both sides of the SAR-Guangdong border, and from the World Health Organisation (WHO), on the origins of the H5N1 influenza virus.
In terms of executive responsibility, H5N1 was killing people here and the SAR Government had to deal with it.
Speculation that some 'Ah Chan' on the other side was in some way responsible for our problems, even if this later proves to be so, was counter-productive.
Our climate, the often filthy conditions in which fresh, unchilled meat and seafood is handled, and our crowded environment make us vulnerable to outbreaks of infectious disease; that standards of hygiene on the mainland or elsewhere in the region may be no better is beside the point. (Actually, the track record of the Chinese Government in containing infectious disease, especially in the countryside, is quite good.) During outbreaks of epidemic diseases, even those such as cholera and hepatitis A which are well understood by medical science, we see evidence of a bizarre 'not from our backyard' mentality in officials and the general public alike.
In the case of H5N1 we were happy to assume it originated over the border, in spite of our incomplete understanding of the disease and the absence of any compelling evidence that this was so.
One wonders whether at least some of the victims had been in the mainland just prior to falling ill, and it would be interesting to know if Guangdong livestock handlers were checked for exposure to the virus by screening for antibodies to H5N1.
Positive results would at least confirm that there might still be a screening for antibodies to H5N1.
Positive results would at least confirm that there might still be an active source of the virus beyond our control in Guangdong.
No doubt this possibility is the reason the Agriculture and Fisheries Department continues to test imports at considerable cost to the community.
If evidence of the virus' existence in Guangdong can't be confirmed, then the monitoring programme on the border might be reviewed, and resources directed elsewhere.
The immediate danger from H5N1 seems to have passed us by.
However, there will be other outbreaks, perhaps of H5N1, certainly of similar flu viruses, and some of them may not be so rapidly contained - if indeed H5N1 was contained and didn't simply die down of its own accord.
To deal effectively with future threats the public health authorities, on both sides of the border and in the international community, must focus on basic scientific detective work.
We still do not know how the virus spreads in animals and how it might spread between people. We can't explain why livestock handlers exposed to the virus did not become ill.
We have no knowledge of their possible role as carriers of the disease. And we can only guess at the possibility of undetected sources of the virus which might create future outbreaks of the disease.
It would be nice to suppose that our officials, their counterparts in Guangdong, and the WHO have put aside bureaucratic sensitivities and are allowing the scientists to find answers to these questions, without fear or favour; only then will it be possible to formulate sensible policies for the future. In the absence of hard information and with people dying, the Government no doubt feels it had little choice but to act as it did, and to continue to regard mainland chicken imports with suspicion.
The results of ongoing scientific investigation may prove that the exercise to destroy every living chicken in Hong Kong was an embarrassing over-reaction. Nonetheless, for the SAR Government to close the investigatory file on H5N1 would be a mistake, and to have to hunt down every live chicken in the SAR again, simply because it didn't know what else to do, would be a disaster.
T. R. COLLARD Chung Hom Kok
