Liquidator Price Waterhouse has raised US$260 million settling derivative positions of Peregrine Fixed Income, but sold none of the largely Indonesian corporate bond portfolio at the centre of the group's collapse. More than 2,000 derivative contracts involving 300 counterparties have been traced, although many remain live - making a definitive picture of the fixed-income unit's liabilities impossible, according to Price Waterhouse. There was no precedent for liquidating a derivative trading investment bank, but 'order has been achieved where there was chaos', said partner Stephen Caswell. Last week saw the first legal action from a creditor bank, with Commerzbank seeking US$40 million for a cross-currency swap entered two days before Peregrine went bust. The German bank wanted to establish a 'proprietorial claim' but the liquidator contended it must line up with other creditors, Mr Caswell said. Legal interpretation of derivative contracts has formed the most complex part of the liquidation process, according to Price Waterhouse partner Simon Copley. While master documents - such as those used by the International Swaps Dealers' Association - had clauses closing the position should one party go under, much of Peregrine's derivative book was not subject to such standard codes. Depending on market movements, many positions could equally end up in the red or the black, making it impossible to pinpoint Peregrine Fixed Income's financial position, he said. Price Waterhouse will report to creditors on June 11 when an oversight committee will be appointed to represent their interests. Having received 50 expressions of interest, it must decide when to sell Peregrine Fixed Income's Asian corporate bond portfolio, which last November had a face value of US$1.1 billion. About US$1.5 billion of bonds held in custody by Peregrine have been returned to investors, while HK$350 million was recovered from the sale of equity derivatives at Peregrine Derivatives. While such sums were significant, they paled next to the amount owed to creditors, although Mr Copley declined to give a precise figure. Commenting on Peregrine Fixed Income's risk-management systems, he said said there were serious failings, but that considerable improvements had been made during its final six months of operation. 'Ultimately it was the assessment credit risk that caused its [Peregrine's] downfall,' he said.