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SCMP Reporter

A FORMER KGB officer has revealed how the Soviet authorities were able to intercept all diplomatic cables coming from Southeast Asian embassies in Moscow.

 The volume of traffic was so great that KGB officers did not even bother to read all the communications from the Indonesian, Malaysian and Thai embassies but concentrated on traffic from the Singaporean diplomatic mission.

 Victor Makarov, 43, was a lieutenant in the KGB before being arrested and sent to a labour camp after he was caught trying to make contact with British intelligence officials.

 He was later released from jail and smuggled out of Russia with assistance from MI6 and is now living in Britain.

 But during his time with the KGB he was responsible for monitoring radio and telegraphic messages from embassies in Moscow using a range of bugging and interception equipment.

 'I was responsible for Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, mostly looking at communications about political and trade issues,' Mr Makarov told the Sunday Morning Post.

 'Practically all their ciphered telegrams were intercepted.

 'We had so much information we just did not know what to do with it. One day I had a telegram about NATO but my boss told me just not to bother about it as there were so many telegrams we had to read.'  The names of trees were used as code names for different countries with Singapore being known as Oak.

 'In the early and mid-80s Singapore was considered very important by the leadership.

 'They thought Singapore understood what was happening in China and we could get a better understanding by listening to what they were saying,' Mr Makarov said.

 But most of the telegrams from the Singaporean Embassy were concerned with information about developments in Eastern Europe.

 Mr Makarov recalled one telegram sent from the embassy in April 1983. 'It began with 'formin', which was their abbreviation for the foreign ministry, and was signed by the first secretary because the ambassador was ill at the time, that's why it sticks in my memory,' he said.

 'It was all about the situation in Poland and said there were signs of the breakdown of the government.'  KGB officers used a number of methods to intercept communications from the embassies, including bugging equipment placed in Teletype machines.

 The bugs were able to intercept messages as they were being typed and before they were encoded.

 But in the mid-80s the Singapore Embassy installed a Teletype machine made by Siemens in Germany that made it more difficult for the KGB to intercept its communications.

 'We were able to read the messages in open text before they were put into code but the signals were rather weak so we began to have problems intercepting them,' he said.

 But later the KGB began using a more powerful computer known by its code name Bulat, Russian for sword, and resumed interception of all messages.

 Information from interceptions was passed on to the chief director of the KGB and then to the heads of department in the Foreign Ministry though they were not told the source of the information.

 Mr Makarov had joined the KGB after working as a cipher officer with the Soviet Navy but became disillusioned with his work and began trying to make contact with British diplomats in 1985.

 But British intelligence took two years to check out his credentials and he was arrested by the Soviet authorities after being betrayed by a friend.

 He spent two years in Lefortovo jail in Moscow before being convicted of treason and sent to the Parm-25 labour camp in the West Urals, 2,000km east of the capital, where he remained until being released in 1992.

 He has been living in the UK since his release from jail but is now pressing the British Government for compensation since he was jailed after being caught offering information to Britain.

 A British Government spokesman would not comment on any assistance Mr Makarov had offered to the intelligence agencies.

 'We are aware of his case and it has been considered by the Secret Service and Intelligence tribunals and he has already received considerable financial and other support,' the spokesman said.

 British intelligence sources confirmed Mr Makarov's role in the third Chief Directorate of the KGB, a highly secret department dealing with signal intelligence known as SigInt.

 A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry in Singapore was unable to comment on whether his Government was aware its embassy's communications had been penetrated.

 But he said the country maintained only a small embassy in Moscow with three or four diplomatic staff and about 10 local staff.



How the KGB kept one jump ahead of Asian embassies