THE emergency meeting of the foreign and finance ministers of the Group of Seven industrialised countries called to discuss aid to Russia came on the initiative of three men: French President Francois Mitterrand, US President Bill Clinton and former US President Richard Nixon.
The US$21.4 billion (HK$165 billion) package ratified by the ministers cannot, at first sight, be said to be too little. If US$15 billion in previously agreed debt relief and US$7 billion in unused loans are added in the total package, it adds up to an impressive-looking US$43.4 billion.
Yet it has come almost certainly too late if its main objective is to secure the political survival of the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin.
That objective would have been better served if there had been speedy and thoughtful implementation of the US$24 billion package agreed at last year's G-7 summit. Since there wasn't (part of today's projected $43.4 billion includes money carried over from the $24 billion) Mr Yeltsin's future rests entirely on whether or not he is able to win majority support at the Russian referendum on April 25, and whether, thereafter, he can shore up his position amidst the almost daily turmoil of Moscow political manoeuvring.
Russian voters in the referendum, and in any subsequent Russian presidential or parliamentary elections, may note that Mr Yeltsin is belatedly garnering substantial Western financial aid. But it seems highly unlikely that aid from Tokyo will quickly translate into tangible political evidence for Russian voters that it is worthwhile supporting the current Russian reform programme.
Instead, Mr Yeltsin's survival depends upon his skill at persuading the people that their current economic hardships are both inevitable and in a good cause, and that his pursuit of foreign aid does not mean he has sold out Russia's soul to foreigners, as his conservative and nationalist opponents often allege.