No one can deny the significant impact of developments in China on Hong Kong. Before 1978, the effects were felt without much direct interaction between the territory and the mainland. In the reform era, the two economies have become more and more closely integrated; and since July 1997, Hong Kong has become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under Chinese sovereignty. As a Chinese SAR, Hong Kong people seem to have a strengthening identification with China. A survey by the Department of Journalism and Communication of the Chinese University of Hong Kong in September 1997 indicated that 32.1 per cent of the respondents identified themselves as 'Chinese', compared with 25.7 per cent in a survey in August 1996; 23.2 per cent identified themselves as 'Hongkongese', compared with 25.2 per cent in the earlier survey. Those who claimed to be 'Hongkongese as well as Chinese' decreased slightly from 32.9 per cent to 31.8 per cent, while those who claimed to be 'Chinese as well as Hongkongese' dropped from 14.7 per cent to 11.6 per cent. In a survey conducted in the summer of 1988 by the social scientists of local tertiary institutions, 63.6 per cent of the respondents chose 'Hongkongese' as their primary identity, while only 28.8 per cent considered themselves as 'Chinese'. While identification with China strengthened in Hong Kong, young people's knowledge of China was still unsatisfactory, though improving slightly. In September 1998, a youth group conducted a survey among people aged 18 to 41. Fifteen per cent of respondents could not identify Jiang Zemin as president of the People's Republic of China, 45 per cent could not name Zhu Rongji as premier, and 81 per cent could not identify Li Peng as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The establishment of the People's Republic of China brought a paradigm shift to the life of the Chinese people. The scale of political mobilisation and the introduction of a planned economy were unprecedented; and there was much enthusiasm for the building of a new China. The anti-rightists' campaign, the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution gradually brought much disillusionment to the population. Economic reforms since 1978 represented another paradigm shift, and another outburst of energy for economic growth. The Chinese people have been absorbed in the improvement of their living standards. They grasp every opportunity to get rich. Before the reform era, China's difficulties were often perceived as opportunities for Hong Kong. After all, it was the Communist revolution that brought the Shanghainese entrepreneurs to Hong Kong, who built the foundation of our manufacturing industries. Today we all appreciate that our prosperity is heavily dependent on that in China, and that Hong Kong relies much more on China than the other way round. The sharp policy reversals in China in the past half century meant that much time had been wasted. It will take many decades for China to catch up with the developed countries. Yet the shifts mentioned above have generated much creativity and adaptability in the Chinese population, as well as an eagerness and aggressiveness to succeed. These qualities seem to be increasingly in short supply in Hong Kong, especially among the younger generation. The community's complacency is a product of our past success. Undoubtedly, Hong Kong people have been working very hard; and they have been very skilful in seizing every opportunity. But the formula for success has not undergone any significant change; and this has resulted in rigidity. When a paradigm shift has taken place, symbolised by the globalisation process, the introduction of hi-tech industries, the need to restructure the economy and to streamline enterprises to cut costs, etc, Hong Kong people at every level have demonstrated a lack of creativity and adaptability. In the early 1980s, when the South Koreans were fast catching up with the Japanese, one statement which captured the South Korean spirit was: 'They think the Japanese are lazy.' Now the elite students from Beijing and Shanghai who have entered our tertiary institutions in recent years certainly think so too. They have politely indicated that our programmes are less demanding. Besides poor language standards, Hong Kong employers have complained of the lack of dedication and unwillingness to sacrifice leisure and comfort of their younger generation of employees. Our superiority complex over our mainland counterparts has been eroding rapidly. It has been replaced by a healthy consideration of how we can tap the talents from the north. Hong Kong's unique role in China's development has been in decline, and competition from other coastal cities has been growing. For example, according to the Far Eastern Economic Review, Shenzhen's ports are taking an increasing share of container traffic from Hong Kong. In 1997, its share was only seven per cent; in 1999, it rose to 17 per cent; and is expected to reach 50 per cent in 2016. If we do not build container terminals No 10 and 11, by then Shenzhen's share would even rise to 61 per cent. In the past two decades, Hong Kong's effect on China was well reflected by the saying: 'Shenzhen learns from Hong Kong; Guangdong learns from Shenzhen; and the whole country learns from Guangdong.' Today, many in Shanghai and Beijing no longer believe they have much to learn from Hong Kong; and they search for models in the US. Yet Hong Kong retains an edge over China in many important areas. During the liquidation of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation (Gitic) in January, the local financial community quietly noted that in the area of corporate governance, Chinese enterprises still had a long way to catch up. The rule of law, freedom of the media, the unrestricted flow of information, etc, ensure that Hong Kong will have a significant role to play in China's future development. This is why we must not allow Hong Kong to become just another Chinese city. Hong Kong has been a window for China. That was why the British administration was tolerated even during the Cultural Revolution. With China opening up, Hong Kong now has to work doubly hard to maintain this window function. It demands that we have to understand the external world better than China, and at the same time we have to satisfy China's needs. Understanding China requires strenuous efforts which can only be maintained by a keen interest and firm dedication; these elements apparently are lacking among Hong Kong people who are very much preoccupied with their daily livelihood concerns. Our younger generation will need a good command of Chinese and English. These are formidable challenges. But we have to remember that our salaries are five to 10 times higher than those of our counterparts across the border, and we have to give value for money. The natural starting point is Guangdong. Officials there have been eager to promote co-operation with Hong Kong; however, they feel constrained because their proposals have to go through the central government which tends to be cautious. They therefore hope that the HKSAR Government will take the initiative. There is a view in the local pro-Beijing circles that Hong Kong government officials are not enthusiastic regarding co-operation with China. At the same time, the HKSAR Government finds it confusing and difficult to handle the aggressive and unco-ordinated approaches to the territory by local governments in Guangdong. It obviously wants to protect its high degree of autonomy too. As the community has greater confidence in the 'one country, two systems' arrangements, a better balance has to be sought. A more important balance to be maintained is that between securing the Chinese leadership's trust for Hong Kong and the effective articulation of the local community's genuine long-term interests. Dr Joseph Cheng is a political scientist at the City University of Hong Kong
