Great power diplomacy with or without the United States.' This brief but bold statement sums up the post-Kosovo foreign policy of President Jiang Zemin. It also underlies much of what Mr Jiang hopes to achieve in his on-going trip to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Given the best of worlds, Mr Jiang would like to inherit the so-called pro-US policy of his mentor, Deng Xiaoping. It was Mr Jiang who tried to forge a 'constructive, strategic partnership' with Washington during the two presidential summits of 1997 and 1998. When Mr Jiang and advisers such as Liu Ji and Wang Huning put together the daguo zhanlue (literally, 'big country strategy') in late 1997, the US was perceived as largely a benign partner. The original version of Mr Jiang's great power diplomacy looked like this: China would pursue a daguo foreign policy, or one commensurate with its growing economic and military might; however, Beijing recognised the superpower status of the US and as far as possible, would seek to work with rather than against Washington in moulding a new global order. In return for advantages such as hi-tech transfer and Washington's recognition of Beijing's goal of national reunification, the party leadership was willing to acquiesce in American domination in areas including Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. Then came the bombshells of 1999: Nato's eastward expansion; Kosovo; an expanded US-Japan security arrangement, seen as a harbinger of an 'Asian Nato'; and Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's 'two states theory', which, Beijing is convinced, has been abetted by anti-China elements in the US and Japan. Mr Jiang has not yet given up hope on the US. Yet after the recent crises, he and his advisers have been spending more time and resources on projecting Chinese power and countering what Beijing perceives as Washington's anti-China containment policy. This shift has been prompted by growing disillusionment with the US. Consider the compound effect of events in the past few weeks: the failure to reach an agreement on the mainland's accession to the World Trade Organisation; the continuation of a 'witch-hunt' which manifested itself in the indictment of McDonnell Douglas for selling machine tools to China; accusations that Beijing is trying to gain control over the Panama Canal via Hong Kong companies; and more trouble on the Taiwan front. Partly thanks to vehement opposition by President Bill Clinton's China aides, it is unlikely that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act will become law. Yet Beijing has been flabbergasted by the strength of support, particularly in the House of Representatives, for upgrading arms sales to Taiwan, including the export of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)-related technology. According to Chinese sources, Mr Jiang's think tanks have concluded that the deterioration in ties is no fluke. They claim that to combat effectively the 'China threat', America was bent on using means including the Taiwan card to prevent China from becoming a great power in the early part of the new century. An internal paper said it was unlikely that bilateral relations would improve after the US presidential elections in November 2000. It expressed pessimism about the China policy of George W Bush. The document said despite former president George Bush being 'an old friend of China', his son would be driven by the new, anti-China realities. It cited the orientation and recent speeches of the Texas governor's principal foreign-policy aides. For example, quite a few of these advisers helped the elder Bush bring about the fall of the Soviet Union. And at least two of the younger Bush's China hands said in August that Washington should come to Taiwan's defence in case it was attacked by the mainland. Mr Jiang has come up with a multi-pronged anti-containment policy. A major thrust is boosting ties with the European Union, a major goal of Mr Jiang's trip to Britain, France and Portugal. According to Beijing University political scientist Liang Shoude, the post-Cold War world is divided into five power centres: superpower US, the EU, Russia, China and Japan. Professor Liang said that while the US was busy wooing power blocs such as the EU, it was anxious to prevent them from building bridges among themselves. 'Any union [among the blocs] will deal a big blow to US hegemonism,' he wrote in a Beijing paper last week. That Mr Jiang has had some success with the EU card was illustrated during his meeting with French counterpart Jacques Chirac on Monday. Both leaders expressed disapproval of TMD - and support for a 'multi-polar world'. Beijing has made even more headway with Russia, its principal supplier of sophisticated weapons. Consider these developments in the past month: a Sino-Russian naval exercise off Shanghai; Moscow's pledge of aid for China's first manned space mission; and a ground-breaking ceremony at a Sino-Russian nuclear plant in Mr Jiang's native Jiangsu province. At the same time, the leadership has launched a new initiative in Africa and the Middle East, underscored by Mr Jiang's tour later this week of Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Given Beijing's traditional friendship with the Middle East, including Israel, it is Mr Jiang's efforts to woo the Africans that has raised eyebrows among the diplomatic community. 'Obsessed with great power politics, Jiang and his advisers had initially neglected Africa,' said a Western diplomat. He added, however, that since early this year Beijing had put together a new Africa strategy partly with the 'anti-US struggle' in mind. A foreign-affairs scholar in Beijing said Africa could help China with mineral resources; high technology and military know-how (for example, from South Africa); and support in the United Nations and other world bodies. 'For reasons including trade and the acquisition of investment, minerals and technology, Beijing will expand its ties with Europe and Africa in any case,' he added. 'Yet the need to win friends to counter American 'hegemonism' has given this diplomatic drive new urgency.' Mr Jiang's new line on the US has met internal opposition, mainly from cadres who believe Beijing should continue Deng's diplomacy of keeping a low profile and never taking the lead in world affairs. The late patriarch told Mr Jiang that China should focus on economic development, whose success was dependent on US co-operation. And until China had become an economic power, Deng said, it would be counter-productive to lock horns with the US in the diplomatic arena. Relatively liberal cadres have also pointed out that Mr Jiang might have exaggerated American 'neo-imperialism'. They said privately that despite occasional intervention overseas such as strikes against Iraq and Yugoslavia, there was a strong trend towards isolationism in US foreign policy. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is an associate editor of the South China Morning Post
