Conflicts allegedly surround the split between pursuing a pro-grassroots line and a pro-middle-class orientation, and between an anti-Beijing and anti-Tung stance and a more moderate and conciliatory approach.

There are indeed younger members of the party who have become impatient and are keen to move up the party ladder much faster in order to qualify for a higher place in its lists for Legco elections. Some of them are district councillors, who in the past could have aspired for membership in the two now-defunct municipal councils to advance their political careers.

There are certainly some voices in the party who, during the present period of economic recession when the lower-income sectors are worst hit, are in favour of a more pro-grassroots policy platform. The intense debate in September last year over the minimum-wage issue was a case in point.

Sentiments also exist that see Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa and his Beijing political masters as major threats to Hong Kong's autonomy and the party as the main bulwark to withstand such threats.

But the mere existence of these dynamics do not necessarily make the Democratic Party conflict-ridden. After all, the party is a kind of broad church within the pro-democracy camp, to which support from a wide social spectrum has been drawn over the years.

Social policies have always been heatedly debated, such as whether an unemployment allowance should have been included in the party's 1995 Legco election manifesto. And how to deal with Beijing is constantly a contentious issue.

But until 1998, the party leadership had persistently adopted a firm but open-minded strategy. Informal though infrequent dialogues with Beijing continued. In late 1997, the party even resolved by an overwhelming majority to field three members to take part in the election of Hong Kong delegates to the National People's Congress, a move quickly thwarted by Beijing by preventing them from getting the necessary number of nominations.

The Democratic Party appears to be in disagreement because its membership embraces a broad spectrum of pro-democracy elements of society. A more homogeneous composition, whether it be middle-class or grassroots inclined, however, would certainly see its support base narrowed.

While some of the party's activists champion a more hardline stance towards the central Government, many party supporters in the electorate prefer a proactive strategy towards Beijing that allows dialogue and engagement but still firmly safeguards Hong Kong's interest under the 'one country, two systems' promise.

Even a sizeable proportion of party members and staff polled by a recent internal survey replied that the party suffered in the September elections partly because it was seen as being too 'anti-China' and anti-government.

There is an increasing recognition that a party compassionate about the well-being of the poor and underprivileged does not necessarily need to be hostile to business enterprises.

A more fundamental problem faced by the party is how to become an effective opposition party in Hong Kong.

Many of its core members come from a social activist background, and have not shed their previous anti-establishment mindset. They do not have sufficient trust in the Legislative Council, and so shift between using their voices in the council chamber and using their 'fists' on the street.

However, as an opposition that has gathered majority support in popular elections, the democrats have to behave less as single-cause advocate groups and more as an organised coalition that has a coherent policy agenda and is able to work with the establishment, whether it be mainland authorities, senior bureaucrats, or business and professional elites. What they need to learn and to master are skills of political engagement.

It is true that in the near future there will be little chance for the people of Hong Kong to elect their own government. The prospect of a majority party from direct election becoming a governing party is remote.

But, if the democrats do not harbour any hopes in eventually becoming a body of greater political influence, how can they cultivate and sustain wider cross-sector electoral support in the long run from those who hope things may change for the better if democrats have more power?

How can they impress their younger and up-coming members who are aspiring for political office that there will be a meaningful political career for them?

If the democrats decide that they would forever be in opposition, how can they have the incentive to devote more attention and energy to policy innovation, instead of simply saying 'no' to the administration?

What the Democratic Party needs is a different mindset which can catch up with the post-1997 political circumstances and voter expectations.

Most voters are not satisfied with a democratic flagship that operates in the same way as radical activists, caring more for symbolic agitation than long-term impact on the system of governance.

If the democrats believe that their entry into politics will make a difference to the lives of ordinary citizens, then they have to show it by pushing for policy reforms and change in the system through active and continual political engagement and negotiation with the powers-that-be, with the backing of strong electoral support. The party needs to modernise and to develop a new reform agenda for the 21st century.

The mainstream faction was blamed by the young turks for being too complacent and lacking new ideas. On the other hand, what the young turks offered was simply a return to the anti-establishment paradigm and social action tactics of the 1980s.

Surely there can be a 'new way' which can be built on the strength of what has been achieved during the past three decades of social movement, by being forward-looking and trying new strategies instead of sticking to old practices and outdated dogmas.

As a party claiming to fight for Hong Kong, the Democratic Party needs to impress upon people the future it is going to bring them. But to start with, it has to show clear vision and strong leadership after two years of ambivalence. It has to prove to the electorate that it is able to be an effective opposition party, before it ultimately demonstrates that its policies and organisational capacities can form the basis of a proper alternative to a government whose legitimacy and performance it challenges.

Dr Anthony Cheung Bing-leung is a former vice-chairman of the Democratic Party and an ex-legislator. He is a member of a task force considering internal reform of the party

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