'We seem to be conducting something we cannot control very well . . . If planes were flying 20 to 50 miles from our shores, we would be very likely to shoot them down if they came in closer, whether through error or not.' THE ABOVE QUOTE was made in a secret White House meeting reviewing the apparent shooting down of an American spy plane by Chinese fighters over the East China Sea that killed all 16 crewmen. United States President Dwight Eisenhower was the speaker. The year was 1956. Mr Eisenhower's comment surfaced in a commentary this week by James Bamford, an expert on America's ultra-secret National Security Agency, the electronic-surveillance institution at the heart of the US intelligence establishment. Mr Bamford questioned the need for 'frequent, provocative, costly and often redundant' patrols, such the EP-3E flight that collided with a Chinese F-8 jet fighter off Hainan Island last Sunday, in an age of powerful land-based listening posts and satellites. 'The purpose of intelligence is to reduce tensions and the possibilities of war, not raise them,' Mr Bamford wrote. His article was one of the few in America questioning the basis of the US actions at the heart of an accident that has thrown fresh doubts on the wider Sino-US relationship as the new Republican administration of President George W. Bush settles into power. Instead, conventional opinion across the US, from academics and analysts, the media and administration officials, has focused largely on China - its expanding but poorly trained military; its bullying use of American crewmen as bargaining chips; its shrill demands for an apology. China has taken a pounding from a range of critics that runs far beyond the usual anti-China crowd in the US Congress. Respected China scholar David Shambaugh, a senior fellow at the independent Washington-based Brookings Institution think-tank, warned that the Chinese Government had 'been accusatory and caustic in its official statements and threatens to deepen the crisis by dragging it out and not acting co-operatively'. William Safire, an arch-conservative columnist with The New York Times, did little to contain his delight: 'The welcome news is how the Chinese leadership is inflicting great damage on its strategic purposes. Its unco-ordinated overreaction to the accident - especially its foolish demand that the US grovel - is a gift to geopolitical realists here and a blow to softie Sinologists and amoral business interests.' To some, it is one more reminder of how China is fast becoming the next Big Threat America faces in the new century. And more than 45 years after Eisenhower's warnings, there is little chance America's demand for surveillance of China will be anything other than a growth industry. This view is propelled by the rhetoric of the Bush White House, suggesting a more cautious engagement with China as a 'strategic competitor' if not quite an enemy. Just last week, Mr Bush was forced to defend the desire for a greater trade and economic relationship, saying that exporting free-market principles would help extend 'American values'. The Big Threat view is set, too, to hover over the next few tricky months in the relationship. Mr Bush must decide on a package of new arms for Taiwan within weeks, and Congress is poised to demand that China not be awarded the Olympics in a vote by the International Olympic committee in June - the same month Congress must vote, thanks to delays in China's entry to the World Trade Organisation, to roll over the mainland's Normal Trade Relations status. Reflecting on the impact of events of the past week, Derek Mitchell of Washington's private Centre for International and Strategic Studies warned of trouble ahead. 'This is going to be a very difficult relationship to manage in the popular realm and the official realm . . . The wider appetites have been whet, and I think it is going to be a very tough year,' Mr Mitchell said. 'In the wider sense, the Hainan incident helps confirm the view of China being a country that is still definitively difficult, one that is hard to deal with . . . The problem we face is that the American people do not have a deep knowledge or understanding of the realities in China. They have more senses and impressions. They think of China and think of Tiananmen, human rights and Taiwan . . . and, of course, the events of the past week.' Bates Gill, the director of the Brookings Centre for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, said he believed it was too early to judge the fallout on perceptions of China and the possible impact on relations, but stressed that vigilance was needed. 'Certainly, the longer it drags on, the more problematic it becomes for the wider relationship,' he said. Sources in the US military and intelligence establishment believe the longer China prolongs the impasse, the more ammunition it provides those who want more priority placed on the Beijing threat. This is highly ironic, given widespread speculation that China might be using the case to try to force an end to coastal surveillance - concerns it has raised with the US bilaterally and on the international stage over the past few years. The incident comes as new Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld oversees a sweeping strategic review of America's military priorities - a study that could have the biggest impact on defence spending and direction since the end of the Cold War. To understand its potential for change, it must be remembered the giant US military still operates largely on Cold War priorities: the need to fight two large-scale wars simultaneously, including a ground war to defend Europe. The review is far from complete, but Pentagon sources believe it is almost certain to put China at the centre of a new drive to re-orient resources, research and development towards the Asian-Pacific region, given the array of potential threats China has produced. Such a move would have sweeping consequences, possibly calling for new types of weapons, new military and diplomatic alliances and far-more-extensive intelligence operations. One of the first actions could be the stationing of a fleet of attack submarines in Guam - a move which could see them deployed for undersea intelligence work, such as spiriting spies ashore or tapping fibre-optic cables, as much as more-conventional patrols. 'If the Pentagon does go ahead - and we believe it will - and put China and the rest of Asia front and centre, it will create big changes for us as well,' one Central Intelligence Agency source said. 'The CIA does not set its own priorities; that comes from other parts of the administration . . . We are here to serve the Government. 'Is China likely to come under greater scrutiny in the years ahead? That is now a virtual certainty. We have already been adjusting our operations towards new threats anyway, and this process can only continue.' US intelligence reports already describe a raft of changes across China's military readiness. Both the Bush administration and the previous administration of former president Bill Clinton have sounded warnings over the buildup in ballistic missiles across from Taiwan. The number of missiles has now topped 300 and is growing at 50 a year. With China's recent purchase of four Kilo-class submarines and two Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia, US intelligence agencies have detected far greater naval activity along the China coast, particularly off Taiwan and Japan. China's eastern and southern submarine fleets have now embarked on greater numbers of long voyages - up to 60 days for its nuclear-powered submarines. The submarines are also travelling further, and the east coast of Taiwan is a popular target. Japan has reported a far greater number of Chinese incursions of its 200-mile (about 32 kilometre) economic zone. Usually just one or two incidents are reported annually. Last year, the Japanese Defence Agency reported 31 incursions by mainland military vessels, along with dozens of missions by scientific and research vessels. Despite such reports, there are analysts who warn that the Bush team and its conservative supporters might risk dangerously overstating the China threat. Retired Colonel Dan Smith of the Centre for Defence Information, another private Washington think-tank, warned that 20 years of 'remarkable' growth in the Sino-US relationship could be put at risk by conservative overreaction. Noting a lack of critical assessments of the US position relating to the Hainan impasse, Mr Smith warned that a prolonged dispute would 'strengthen the hand of conservative elements'. 'Overall, the new trend is not favourable,' he said. 'I worry that the wider trend here is symptomatic of the sense that we won the Cold War and that we are the sole remaining superpower, so we can do whatever we like. Nothing is that simple.' Greg Torode ( torode@scmp.com ) is the Post's Washington correspondent