It is not entirely clear from his latest published thoughts on the matter what distinction Hong Kong Monetary Authority chief Joseph Yam Chi-kwong makes between independence and accountability.
In his latest weekly column on the authority's Web site, in which he rails at legislators for trying to have a say in whether he can take HK$4 billion out of the Exchange Fund to buy new offices for the HKMA, he is certainly loud for the independence of the HKMA.
'There is one essential point, however, which has to be made crystal clear, in the best interests of Hong Kong,' he writes. 'This is to make sure that there is no scope for political interference in the work of the HKMA.
'The experience of the great majority of central-banking institutions in other parts of the world points unambiguously to the fact that success in monetary management and the credibility of monetary policy depend crucially on the independence of central banks in discharging their responsibilities.'
But then he goes on to agree that the HKMA should be held accountable for its management of the Exchange Fund.
What is it to be? Do legislators have the right to demand answers to nasty questions about why he wants to spend so much or is this 'political interference'? Does he mean that he is accountable when he spends Exchange Fund money but independent when he deals with monetary matters? It is not as clear as it should be.
So let us make another thing crystal clear. The independence of central banks from political interference is all very well in theory, but nowhere near so clean in practice. When governments in most of Asia pay lip service to central-bank independence they mean where they put their thumbs after sticking them in central-bank pies. That is one reason why we had an Asian financial crisis in 1997.