Inside track
THE FIRST time Tung Chee-hwa stood for Chief Executive, Beijing insisted he had to win the post through a contested selection process in 1996.
One which, even if it was scarcely a real election in the normal meaning of the term, at least bore some of the trappings of one. Mr Tung had to issue a manifesto and hit the campaign trail, visiting slum dwellers and - in his own words - doing everything 'short of kissing babies' to win the support of the electoral college charged with choosing the Chief Executive.
Most importantly, he faced real rivals. Then chief justice Yang Ti-liang was widely believed to have entered the race at least partly at the urging of locally based mainland officials. Tycoon Peter Woo Kwong-ching reportedly also received Beijing's blessing before throwing his hat into the ring.
Of course, neither ever stood any chance of success. But their enthusiastic campaigning did serve to confer more legitimacy on Mr Tung's eventual landslide, with 80 per cent of the college's votes. It also served another purpose for Beijing, by showing that its promise of 'one country, two systems' was more than mere rhetoric.
Contrast that contested selection in 1996 with what is likely to happen when Mr Tung stands for the post again next March. Despite vigorous protests from the democratic camp in the Legislative Council last week, the SAR Government seems determined to ensure that the Chief Executive Election Bill - now wending its way towards the statute books - maximises the chances of him being returned unopposed.
It stacks the odds against any challengers by requiring them to obtain nominations from 100 of the 800-member Election Committee that will choose the Chief Executive. And it controversially stipulates the names of these nominators will be made public, so revealing their opposition to Mr Tung.
As mainland leaders have made clear their strong support for Mr Tung serving a second term, it is unlikely many in this predominantly conservative body would be willing to publicly defy Beijing's wishes by doing this. Recently China has even dropped hints it would rather see him returned unopposed, with Vice-Premier Qian Qichen saying in March that he couldn't see any other candidates.
That may seem strange, given the benefits Beijing derived from a contested selection in 1996, an option which some believe would also ideally be its preferred solution this time round.
'I don't think Beijing is particularly happy about not having an election,' said Professor Lau Siu-kai of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 'Its best scenario would be to have Mr Tung win by a big margin again.'
But, unlike in 1996, there is no prospect of that happening. Mr Tung is now so unpopular that, even in such a small-circle poll, his victory in a contested selection could not be guaranteed. And even though he would probably still win, it would not be by anything like the decisive margin last time.
As a narrow victory would only further undermine Mr Tung's authority, Beijing probably feels it has no choice but to head off any risk of a contest.
That is not an ideal solution from its perspective. Just as a contested selection strengthened 'one country, two systems' in 1996, so the lack of a contest is likely to increase scepticism about the concept this time.
But Beijing is evidently unwilling to abandon a Chief Executive whom it so strongly trusts. So Mr Tung's unpopularity has left it with little choice but to opt for what Professor Lau says it sees as the 'lesser of two evils'.
Danny Gittings is the Post's Editorial Pages Editor
