TWO INTRIGUING CLAIMS recently emerged illuminating North Korea's off-the-books relationship with the United States. First, a senior military official told the US Congress that North Korea was the nation carrying the most serious potential to involve the US in a large-scale war. General Thomas Schwartz, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations and US forces in South Korea, warned that North Korea People's Army units were 'bigger, better, closer and deadlier' than just one year earlier. About 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery pieces and 2,000 tanks were massed within 145 kilometres of the De-militarised Zone that separates the North from the South. Second, despite such danger, the fragile nature of communications across the diplomatic ice between Washington and Pyongyang became alarmingly clear. Charles Pritchard, a special envoy on Korea in the new administration of US President George W. Bush, said there were currently only links between the State Department and North Korean diplomats attached to the UN in New York. When pushed by concerned congressmen about something more direct in case of a crisis, Mr Pritchard outlined the possibility of a 'very informal' ability to call Pyongyang in the near future. 'We have phone numbers; we have fax [numbers]. That's possible,' he told a sub-committee of the International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives. Few were reassured. Six months into Mr Bush's term, it seems his administration's policies towards Pyongyang can only go in one direction - up. The next few months could provide the first signs of whether Mr Bush's frosty start has damaged America's role in any reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula after the diplomatic euphoria of the last days of his predecessor, former president Bill Clinton. Riding a wave of goodwill following South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's historic mission to Pyongyang a year ago, Mr Clinton despatched then-secretary of state Madeleine Albright to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-il soon after. He came close to going to North Korea himself to complete a weapons agreement in his last days of office in December. Mr Bush, despite hearing personally from Kim Dae-jung on the importance of intensifying his 'sunshine policy', froze ties ahead of a sweeping review to realign Mr Clinton's overtures with a new Republican foreign policy. In the vacuum that has followed, Beijing, Moscow and Seoul have become closely involved. The next moves might depend on how much Kim Jong-il feels he can trust Mr Bush as he inches forward to dip his toes in the waters of global diplomacy. Some in Mr Bush's administration seem all too keen to keep painting the North Korean leader as the head of an uncontrollable 'rogue state' bent on expanding its abilities to hit the US and its Asian allies with missiles. They use North Korea's pariah status as partial justification for the Bush administration's controversial missile-defence plans. Certainly, his on-going journey by armoured train through Russia is doing little to endear him to hard-headed Republican insiders as a man with whom Washington can do business. Mr Kim's indulgence in a little Soviet-era pageantry had Moscow residents puzzled, much less hawkish anti-communists in Washington. Russian President Vladimir Putin seemed keen to let his counterpart have his fun. Goose-stepping guards - not seen since 1993 - escorted Kim Jong-il to Lenin's tomb in Red Square as he laid a wreath on Saturday morning. Russian officials noted his 'quaint mentality' with nostalgia, saying they were happy to oblige. Republican officials were less polite. 'Everything about this trip is strange,' one Republican source said privately. 'We are talking about arguably the most eccentric leader left on the planet.' Although Bush administration officials note Kim Jong-il's trip - his first to a country other than China since assuming power in 1994 - is probably a step in the right direction, there was little else of any hope in it for them. In something of a dollar-each-way gesture, Mr Putin and Kim Jong-il signed a joint statement that termed North Korea's missile programmes 'peaceful in nature' - effectively no threat to the US. It added, however, that Kim Jong-il had confirmed his intention to stick to a ban on testing ballistic missiles until 2003. Some reports from Moscow suggest North Korea also revived an earlier plan to scotch its missile plans altogether in a swap for help in launching satellites. Moscow said it would be happy to do it - but only on a commercial basis - adding that it would also accept payment from the US. What is getting more immediate attention in Washington, however, is the wider symbolism of the mission. Mr Putin, who remains suspicious if diplomatic about Mr Bush's missile-defence plans, seems to know he can weaken Washington's arguments if he can draw North Korea out internationally. Kim Jong-il, meanwhile, gains some leverage if he can boost his dealings with the likes of Moscow and Seoul. Some diplomatic speculation suggests he might be eyeing an historic mission to Seoul before the end of the year - with or without talks with the Bush team first. The same arguments apply for China, too, and Beijing's role over the next weeks and months is being closely scrutinised in Washington. Beijing is expected to despatch a delegation to Pyongyang next month. The extent to which China nudges Pyongyang towards engagement with Mr Bush would be seen as one tangible benefit from a recent warming in Sino-US ties. The issue did surface during the visit to Beijing last week by US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Derek Mitchell, a former Clinton administration official in the Pentagon and now a scholar at the private Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said he expected North Korea to skirt Washington in its diplomatic manoeuvrings. 'The North Koreans still don't trust this administration and its attitude,' Mr Mitchell said. 'They seem to be sending a message that they will happily build up alternative centres of power by dealing ever more closely with China and Russia . . . I really don't see any likelihood of this changing in the near term.' In theory, Mr Bush's review is over, but little movement has yet been noted. Despite claims of no preconditions, many observers believe Pyongyang is wary of Mr Bush's demands. As well as the missile programme, Mr Bush called for talks to include North Korea's conventional armed forces, estimated to be the fifth largest in the world. He also wanted expanded international inspections of its nuclear-power facilities. 'If North Korea responds affirmatively and takes appropriate action, we will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions and take other political steps,' the White House statement said. 'We will pursue these discussions in the context of a comprehensive approach to North Korea which will seek to encourage progress towards North-South reconciliation, peace on the Korean Peninsula, a constructive relationship with the US and greater stability in the region.' Mr Bush is still waiting. But some commentators have praised his caution. Balbina Hwang, a scholar at the conservative Heritage Foundation think tank in Washington, described the new Bush line as 'pragmatic engagement coupled with credible deterrence'. 'The North has yet to provide concrete evidence to back up its professed willingness to reconcile with the South and reduce tensions on the peninsula,' Ms Hwang wrote. 'North Korea remains a totalitarian regime that poses significant conventional military and possible nuclear threats to the US as well as its allies, South Korea and Japan.' When Mr Bush announced he was ready to resume talks with Pyongyang, his officials were keen to insist that 'the ball is now in North Korea's court' - a standard Washington negotiating stance. That might be true, but for the time being at least, Kim Jong-il seems keen to play with everyone else. Greg Torode ( torode@scmp.com ) is the Post's Washington correspondent
