IS THE NEW ministerial system of government nothing more than another step along the road to authoritarianism, as its opponents allege? Or is it the golden key that will rescue Hong Kong from a sea of self-doubt and indecision. Mr Tung's supporters have argued that in his first term he was unable to function effectively because he did not have his own team to help him devise and push through policies. The Chief Executive, they say, was confronted by a civil service that was either unable or unwilling to put his ideas into action, and an obstreperous Legco that had no interest in doing anything other than blocking his policies. Now, at last, Mr Tung has been able to assemble a team of like-minded men and women who will help implement his policies. This quasi-cabinet will be loyal and accountable to him, will act as an interface with the civil service, and will help win public support for his policies. With this kind of backing, Mr Tung cannot but succeed, supporters of the new system argue. On the other side of the fence, the Democrats and their supporters say the ministerial system is inherently authoritarian and will serve only to concentrate more power in the Chief Executive and reduce the role the civil service and Legco play as a check on executive power. All of Mr Tung's weaknesses will only be magnified by the new system, since there will be no effective checks and balances, they argue. The truth is that the new system will neither be a magic formula for better governance, nor a disguised route to a more authoritarian government. If Mr Tung picks the right people, the new system can help to create and implement more coherent policy. Its main virtue is that it breaks with the colonial system of the civil servants creating and implementing policy. Policy will be made by the Chief Executive and his cabinet, and implemented by the civil service. This is the way modern systems function. As part of Hong Kong's colonial legacy, there is a belief the civil service should remain independent of the Chief Executive and make its own decisions on whether to implement his policies. This explains the worries that the new system would in some way destroy the independence of the civil service. In no country is the civil service meant to be independent. Its sole function is to carry out the policies of the government, in accordance with the law. The real issue is whether Mr Tung will be more willing to take hard decisions than in his first term. This will be the acid test. The real weakness of his first term was not the lack of a team of suitable advisers, but a reluctance to take hard decisions. There are plenty of hard decisions that need to be taken. With the property bubble that brought so many years of seemingly effortless prosperity broken, Hong Kong has to reinvent and reshape itself to survive. Government finances have to be put in order, either through a drastic pruning of the size of government, or by finding fresh sources of revenue. Private businesses will have to restructure to face competition from the mainland, as well as to capitalise on opportunities in a rapidly growing China. Hong Kong must decide how it can mesh economically with the Pearl River Delta, as well as the rest of the global economy. Part of this reinvention will happen by allowing the market to take its course. But the Government will have a major role in ensuring markets are allowed to function freely. Most important, it will have to garner public support for what will be a difficult restructuring process. The success of the new system will be measured by how well it accomplishes these tasks.