SO FAR, THE orders from Beijing in response to Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's call for a referendum to decide the island's future have amounted to nothing more than public sabre-rattling. While Chinese spokesmen and the government-controlled media issued dire warnings and sought to play up pre-planned war exercises on the Fujian coast opposite Taiwan, the official response has been limited to rhetoric. The mainland leadership appears to have come a long way since 1996, when it conducted major military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and fired four ballistic missiles into waters north and south of the island. Those heated, but apparently calculated, actions were made in relation to former president Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the US in mid-1995 and to frighten voters away from supporting the increasingly pro-independence leader during the first direct presidential elections (he was subsequently elected). The US deployed two aircraft carriers, along with their battle groups, to the area. Six years later and much has changed. Mr Lee retired in 2000, when the electorate chose Mr Chen, of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, over Mr Lee's KMT successor; a conservative Republican administration in Washington is pursuing a more cautious policy towards Beijing while showing stronger signs of support - including military assistance - for Taipei; and Taiwan appears to be drifting further away from the mainland. So why has the Chinese leadership, headed by Jiang Zemin, displayed so much restraint over the latest tensions sparked by the Taiwan president's remarks early this month? Political analysts say the leadership might have been distracted by machinations surrounding the expected retirement plans of Mr Jiang, which have been thrown into doubt in the past few months; preparations for the 16th Communist Party Congress to be held this autumn; or that China's entry into the World Trade Organisation might have moderated the response. Military analysts have another theory. Western security analysts say Beijing is not yet ready to go to war over Taiwan, particularly because a victory by technologically inferior mainland forces against a higher-tech Taiwanese military, with possible US backing, is far from guaranteed. Chinese strategy experts reject the Western analyses, saying they underestimate the political will of Beijing, with its much larger reserves of manpower, to achieve reunification. 'We always win wars with strategy and not with advanced weapons,' said Professor Yan Zuetong, director of the International Affairs Research Institute at Beijing's Tsinghua University. 'In China, the military approach is determined by politics,' he said, adding the political goal was to 'solve the Taiwan problem'. This view echoes not only Mao Zedong but resembles the dictum of 19th-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz: 'War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means.' On the other hand, it also suggests the ultimately peaceful approach advocated by Sun Tzu: 'The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.' While some think the possibility of conflict over Taiwan is very remote, there is evidence Beijing and Taipei take the threat very seriously. For the past two decades, both sides have been engaged in what are essentially propaganda and political contests which have so far managed to avoid the dangers of brinkmanship. Washington has repeatedly raised concerns about what it says is a build-up of ballistic missiles - now estimated to number about 300 - along the Fujian coast. The latest of a new round of joint PLA exercises involving land, navy and air forces is reportedly under way off the Fujian coast. The summer military exercises are an annual event but last year they were openly touted as plans for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, conducted at Dongshan Island and dubbed 'Exercise Liberation 1'. The reported aim was to seek sea supremacy and counter US aircraft carriers which might be despatched to intervene in a conflict. On the other side of the strait, the Taiwanese military conducts annual joint-forces exercises. A simulated PLA invasion of the island held in April this year caused a stir when the 'red' team representing the mainland won. A military showdown between mainland China and Taiwan would be one of the bloodiest battles of modern history, according to US analysts. Their computer modelling and war gaming has shown that even without direct US intervention, Taiwan probably has enough firepower to repel an invasion by the PLA. With the help of American air power flying from aircraft carriers and Japan, Taiwan would almost certainly remain beyond Beijing's grasp, the analysts conclude. Even the mainland's ongoing acquisition of modern Russian equipment such as Su-30 jet fighters and Kilo-class submarines is unlikely to turn the tide anytime in the next five to 10 years, according to these assessments. 'China could not take Taiwan, even if US combat forces did not intervene in a conflict. Nor will China be able to invade Taiwan for at least a decade if not much longer,' said Michael O'Hanlon, a professor at Princeton and Columbia universities, in a study titled 'Can China conquer Taiwan?'. While the tremendous political and economic cost to both sides if war were to break out make an invasion hard to fathom, decades of sabre-rattling by the mainland and the potential for US involvement make the strait one of the world's most watched and analysed flashpoints. An attack would be a huge escalation from other alternatives which China is believed to have. These alternatives can be viewed as diplomatic, economic and military. US analysts believe Beijing has a range of escalating options which could be triggered by a Taiwanese attempt to incorporate independence into its constitution. China could seek to impose an embargo or sanctions by warning other countries not to trade with Taiwan, which could also involve more provocative steps such as the PLA navy searching ships passing through the strait. A more confrontational Chinese approach could involve staging military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in waters and air space near the main island. This could include air patrols over the central strait. A military blockade of Taiwan using Chinese vessels is estimated to take up to a year to put into place. A Taiwanese declaration of independence is expected by some US analysts to be met with artillery fire and missile launches aimed at the main island or its smaller islands. Some analysts suggest Beijing would opt for a massive, pre-emptive surprise attack in an attempt to catch Taiwan off guard and deliver a deadly blow before the US could intervene effectively. The PLA has relied on surprise attacks in its major foreign campaigns - Korea, India and Vietnam - and based on its published doctrine, can be expected to do so again. In most models examined, the war would be won or lost even before mainland ground troops tried to force their way across the 160km-wide strait. The envisioned conflict has been likened to a modern-day Battle of Britain in which Germany needed to control the skies over the United Kingdom before attempting a landing. Likewise, the PLA air force would need to subdue the Taiwanese air force - and possibly their American allies - before attempting an amphibious or airborne invasion. The PLA is said to lack the military airlift and sealift capacity to make a forced crossing in strength, and would be expected to use a rag-tag fleet of civilian cargo and fishing boats to move its invasion force. Military planners say the flotilla would be cut to ribbons by anti-shipping missiles and precision-guided munitions if not protected from the air. The first blows in the battle could come from the hundreds of land-attack missiles the mainland has aimed at Taiwan. The best fighter aircraft in the Chinese inventory - Russian-made Su-27s and Su-30s - would engage Taiwan's US-supplied F-16s, French-designed Mirage 2000s and indigenous Ching-kuos in a swirling dogfight in the crowded airspace. On the ground, scores of mainland agents would attempt to destroy key infrastructure, such as radar bases, and assassinate military and political leaders. The PLA's land-attack missiles have long been a point of contention, with analysts saying the missiles' relatively small payload and lack of accuracy would result in little significant harm to Taiwan. 'It is far from clear that it would be in fact sufficient to materially devastate Taiwan's military, economy or society,' said a report from US think tank, the Rand Corporation. Taiwan does not fare any better when it comes to recent combat experience, but observers believe pilots in Taiwan receive better training and more flying hours each year, giving them an edge over their mainland counterparts. In a Rand Corporation battle simulation, the mainland lost 75 per cent of the 1,000 aircraft it committed to an attack, and Taiwan lost 45 per cent of its 400 planes, in only four days of fighting. Such devastating losses to the PLA air force could cripple an invasion effort even before it started, as the defenders in a situation of air-parity could attack the vulnerable airborne or amphibious forces while they were en route. The PLA's ability to mass troops and continue to build up and resupply their forces on Taiwan would be key to victory. Mr O'Hanlon estimated that the PLA would be able to land about 20,000 troops in the first 48 hours of an attack. Over the same period, he said Taiwan could mobilise 100,000 troops, who, unlike their mainland counterparts, would have full access to heavy armour, artillery and stockpiles of supplies. 'The situation would continue to deteriorate from there for China,' Mr O'Hanlon said. Analysts believe it is highly unlikely that Beijing would use nuclear weapons on Taiwan as the political fallout would be too great. Limited use of chemical weapons on airfields and troop concentrations is, however, seen as plausible. Some official US analysts believe China lacks the technology and the quantity of equipment to conduct an amphibious assault, and assess it could only be undertaken sometime in the next 20 years when the economy and military are further developed. Professor Yan said while the PLA could not compete with the US in terms of its military, the two nations' vastly different cultures led US analysts to view China's options from their own perspective, which was technical rather than political. One thing that is on the mainland's side is time. Glenn Schloss and Doug Nairne are staff writers for the Post Graphic: FORCEGET