Rough ride
North Korea's nuclear problem is a puzzle for everyone. It seems that reaching a consensus on the subject is almost impossible. US intelligence on the North's suspected nuclear weapons programme is a lot different from that of South Korea or Japan. Some believe the North has already completed its nuclear arsenal and is ready to declare this any moment. Others argue the North is just bluffing, trying to use the threat as a bargaining chip. Journalists who cover the topic sometimes wonder whether there is any truth to any of these reports.
This feeling of confusion was compounded recently by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's comments that sometimes incorrect news reports about the nuclear problem mislead people. He was apparently referring to stories coming out of the US that more or less concluded that the North is already a nuclear power which seriously threatens the security of Northeast Asia. American media quoted US government sources as saying that officials in Pyongyang had told them the North had already completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods at Yongbyon, its main nuclear complex, into weapons-grade plutonium.
The South Korean government is not sure if the claim is true. Mr Roh, until recently, stressed that there was no clear evidence backing these reports. But the problem is, his government's official announcements themselves are not supported by any evidence either. South Korea says the North's nuclear problem is not yet a full-blown crisis and there is still room for a peaceful solution. But in saying so, Mr Roh's government does not provide much information to back up its position. Rather, it just continues to express optimism without explaining why the rest of us can be optimistic.
Even after the North reportedly told the US that it had completed the reprocessing process, South Korea remained quiet. It convened a security meeting of cabinet ministers and top advisers the next day. But the details of the meeting were kept secret, despite the huge public attention drawn to the session. As the South has failed to satisfy the curiosity of both journalists and the general public, the guessing game on the nuclear issue continues.
There could be several reasons why Mr Roh and his advisers are tight-lipped these days. Since the North Korean nuclear issue resurfaced last October, the South's government has been on the defensive. The so-called 'sunshine policy' of engaging North Korea pursued by Mr Roh's predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, suddenly lost steam after the North was found to have violated several international accords on its nuclear programme. As the US, South Korea's most important ally, became critical of the engagement policy, Mr Roh, who inherited it from Mr Kim, has been travelling on a bumpy road from his early days in office. Against this backdrop, the South Korean government might have concluded that the best way to avoid a clash with the US is to remain silent.
There is also the fact that the Roh administration does not have many people who can convincingly articulate and defend its position. Mr Roh discourages his advisers on the subject to meet and talk to the media. After they joined the government, a small number of security experts at private think-tanks - who used to defend the engagement policy - suddenly became inaccessible. Meanwhile, the voices from the opposition camp, which are critical of the policy, are getting louder, as they do not shun the media. Mr Roh's North Korean policy may be right, but his approach to promoting it is surely not.
