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War on terror: the real casualty of the Philippine mutiny

Although it lasted only 20 hours, the mutiny of elite troops in Manila leaves deeply troubling concerns about the readiness of the Philippines' armed forces to effectively combat terrorists. The scout rangers and special-warfare marines who carried out this feckless act are the kind of highly motivated fighters the United States has trained with a view to carrying out other campaigns against Abu Sayyaf rebels. But because their leadership failed them, many of the mutineers will either be cashiered or no longer be trusted with important commands.

Defence Secretary Angelo Reyes, whose resignation the mutineers had demanded, has some explaining to do. To be fair, he cannot be blamed for the dry rot of previous administrations. The system was profoundly corrupted during Ferdinand Marcos' martial-law presidency and it remains in an alarming state of disrepair.

To be sure, too, some of the mutineers' grievances are the kind commonly heard from the lower ranks of this hazardous, low-paid and often underappreciated profession. Their comrades die fighting Muslim separatists and brigands, while senior officers strike corrupt deals. Their families barely scrape by, while retired senior officers live in the comparative luxury of housing built for US military advisers.

But this venting of anger also reflects a low state of morale among officers and soldiers that can be a danger to democracy unless it is promptly attended to. At the very least, Mr Reyes should no longer delay the implementation of a Joint Defence Assessment survey, carried out by the US and the Philippines, to fix the military's shortcomings. He was chief of staff when the survey was carried out, so he should know what it entails. The report remains classified, because it reveals strategic vulnerabilities that some future enemy could exploit.

But the nature of the weaknesses and what can be done to shore up the military are generally known to anyone who pays attention. The soldiers who mounted last weekend's uprising would agree with many of the assessment's recommendations to make the armed forces a more capable fighting unit.

Improvements must be made in the ratio of non-combat personnel needed to support troops in the field. It currently takes 10 personnel to support one soldier. That needs to come down considerably. The proportionally excessive expenditure on personnel - about 80 per cent of the total budget - is also questioned. This amounts to a higher cost-per-soldier than that in Thailand, which has a higher standard of living. And it begs another question: if the army spends such a huge portion of its budget on personnel, why are the scout rangers complaining about inadequate housing and low pay?

Another key recommendation addresses a major scandal - the military's poor record of equipment maintenance. Philippine officials admit that hand-me-down helicopters from the US are constantly being cannibalised to keep the remaining ones flying. They also report that only one of eight C-130s in the air force inventory, including two transferred by the US after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's first visit to Washington in November 2001, is still capably of flying missions.

Mr Reyes has been pressing the US for more acquisitions, but Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in whose name the assessment was issued, has so far refused to be drawn.

The survey wants to see less emphasis on acquisitions, and more resources invested in operation and maintenance. Indeed, it urges contracting out maintenance work to the more efficient private sector. Navy Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, one of the leaders of the uprising, is certainly aware of the need for reform in this area. According to one Philippine press account, a thesis he wrote for a master's degree in public administration was entitled Corruption in the Philippine Navy Procurement System.

Mr Reyes will also have to prove that he is not holding the US-Philippine joint exercises merely to suit the military's own needs. The impression is that the armed forces chiefs are more interested in replenishing depleted supplies from the fuel, ammunition and excess equipment left behind by the US trainers, than in accommodating America's desire for more results in the counter-terrorism war.

Finally, the military leadership has to work harder at exorcising the praetorianist spirit that still lurks among the younger batches of graduates from the Philippine Military Academy. After the last of the six coup attempts that rocked the Corazon Aquino administration, an independent report warned that the military is 'no longer just an instrument of government. It is, in reality, a major partner in the system of present-day governance whose views, especially in security matters, prevail over those of its civilian counterparts.'

One of the leaders of that botched coup in 1989, now a presumably respectable member of the Philippine Senate, is busy denying he had any part in encouraging Lieutenant Trillanes and his friends to mutiny.

Eduardo Lachica is a veteran analyst of Asian affairs based in Washington

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