Taiwan's presidential elections are still seven months away, but the political posturing - on both sides of the strait - has already begun. The latest salvo comes in the form of reported plans to set up an airborne unit in the coastal city of Hangzhou, about one hour's flight time from Taiwan. Such a plan will no doubt be noticed across the strait, where pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian will next spring face off against a combined ticket of pro-unification candidates, Lien Chan of the Kuomintang and James Soong of the People First Party. The expansion of military power aimed at Taiwan, along with periodic exercises along the nearby coast, is meant as a warning against electing independence-minded politicians. But as past experience suggests, sabre-rattling is likely to have the opposite effect.
The missile tests of 1995-96 that preceded the island's first direct presidential election certainly proved to the world - and the people of Taiwan - that the mainland has the necessary firepower to act on its assertion that it will attack if Taiwan chooses independence. The 'deterrence factor' has since then grown exponentially, with hundreds of missiles deployed within striking distance of the island, and dozens are added each year. Although it does not yet have air superiority in the strait, plans to upgrade the PLA's attack capabilities through the development of an airborne troop division will surely be interpreted in Taipei as a threat - even though they are consistent with overall modernisation plans.
Meanwhile, Mr Chen and his opponents cannot be expected to refrain from using the issue for political purposes. Mr Chen's Democratic Progressive Party has joined forces with the staunchly pro-independence ex-president Lee Teng-hui, who swept back into office after the 1996 missile tests. Every time a new report of the mainland's military capabilities is issued they cite it as proof of the folly of seeking unification with an aggressor. This is a difficult line for his KMT and PFP opponents to counter.
Although pre-election rhetoric and manoeuvring from both sides do not seem to have diminished since the last presidential poll, there is a key difference between then and now. Economic ties are closer than they have ever been. It is estimated that more than a million Taiwanese now reside on the mainland, and Taiwan-invested factories account for as much as half of the country's annual exports of information technology products. The biggest incentive for the peaceful resolution of the differences between the two sides lies in the continuous strengthening of these ties.
Nevertheless, the central leadership faces a dilemma. In responding to pro-independence statements and gestures in Taiwan, it has to make its position crystal clear - both for domestic and external consumption. The danger, however, is that it also risks overplaying its hand by emphasising its military options - as it did in 1996.
If the Hangzhou airborne unit's establishment is followed by more muscle-flexing, Taiwan's voters may once again flee into the arms of politicians advocating a more blatant pro-independence line. It would perhaps be more productive to shift gears and concentrate on discussion, dialogue and persuasive argument - historical, nationalistic, political and economic. There has been increasing evidence of this understanding being accepted by mainland policymakers since Mr Chen's election. This is to be encouraged, as Taiwan's voters have perennially shown their preference to continue with the status quo and not veer towards independence. Given the increasingly warm trade ties, why risk forcing the Taiwanese into a premature, and possibly reactive, stance on cross-strait relations?
