It is high time South Korea's President Roh Moo-hyun reconsidered his North Korean policy. At a time of growing international alarm over the North's nuclear arms programme, he needs to forge a broader domestic consensus. There is no room for partisan bickering. Mr Roh can start by sketching a new policy outline based on a more realistic perception of the North's nuclear threat.
North Korea's jarring declaration that it would boycott further negotiations to resolve the crisis over its nuclear-weapons programmes is only the latest reminder that the South's continuing indulgence of North Korean diplomatic tantrums has outlived its usefulness. The statement came just hours after the conclusion of last week's ground-breaking six-nation talks in Beijing.
Whether the North's wish to pursue a nuclear deterrent instead of talks is a bluff or not, it presages a long and arduous process of crisis resolution that will shake the foundation of Mr Roh's appeasement policy.
So far, the North has responded to his reconciliation drive with nothing but contempt. North Korea came to the six-party talks because of the Bush administration's consistently hardline approach to its nuclear gambit. China helped nudge North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to the conference table, but it was America's refusal to deal with him directly that made the Beijing talks possible. Mr Roh must end his ambiguous position as a neutral in this standoff.
At home, an essential element of his new approach to North Korea ought to be a show of genuine bipartisanship. When he came to office six months ago, he pledged to bring better policy co-ordination with the opposition Grand National Party. That made sense, for the GNP controls a solid conservative majority in the single-chamber parliament.
Today, however, South Korea remains acutely divided along an ideological fault line so deep that its last Independence Day ceremony on August 15 was observed separately by the conservative hardliners blasting the North Korean leadership and liberal, pro-unification groups calling for faster reconciliation with the North.
This was reminiscent of the South's political chaos just before the start of the Korean war in 1950, when Stalinists in the North mistook the South's division as an invitation for an invasion. South Korea risks repeating such dangerous consequences unless the Roh government collects itself and stands firmer against the clear and present threat from the North. South Korea's position on the issue of nuclear weapons at the next round of six-party talks - if they do take place - should no longer be uncertain.